have seen that in every succeeding election in both Canadas there has been an in-ereasing disinclination, on the part of men of standing and political experience and weight in the country, to become candidates; while, on the other hand, all the young men, the active politicians, those who have resolved to embrace the life of a statesman, have sought entrance to the House of Assembly. The nominative system in this country, was to a great extent successful, before the introduction of responsible. Then the Canadas were to a government. great extent Crown colonies, and the upper-Branch of the legislature consisted of gentlenien chosen from among the chief judicial and eccl-siastical diguitaries, the heads of departments, and other men of the first. position in the country. Those bodies com-manded great respect from the character, standing, and weight of the individuals com posing them, but they had little sympathy with the people or their representatives, and collisions with the Lower House frequently occurred, especially in hower Canada. When responsible government was introduced, it became necessary for the Governor of the is only valuable as being a regulating body; day to have a body of advisers who had the confidence of the House of Assembly: which could make or unmake ministers The Lower House in effect as it chose pointed out who should be nominated to the Upper House; for the ministry, being dependent altogether on the lower branch of. the legislature for support, selected members for the Upper House from among their political friends at the dictation of the House of Assembly. The Council-was becoming less and less a substantial check on the legislation of the Assembly; but under the system now proposed, such will not be the case. No ministry can in future do what they have ·ione in Canada before.--- they cannot, with the view of carrying any measure, or of strengthening the party, attempt to overrule the independent opinion of the Upper House, by filling it with a number of its partisans and political supporters. The provision in the Constitution, that the Legislative Council shall consist of a limited number of members -that each of the great sections shall appoint. twenty-four members and no more, will, prevent the Upper House from being. swamped from time to time by the ministry of the day, for the purpose of carrying out their own schemes or pleasing their partisans. The fact of the government, being

prevented from exceeding a limited number will preserve the independence of the Upper House, and make it, in reality, a separate and distinct chamber, having a legitimate and controlling influence in the legislation of the country. The objection has, been taken that in consequence of the Crown. being deprived of the right of unlimited appointment, there is a chance of a dead lock arising between the two branches of the legislature; a chance that the Upper House being altogether independent of the Sovereign, of the Lower House, and of the advisers of the Crown, may act. independently, and so independently as to produce a dead lock. I do not anticipate any such result. In the first place we know that in England it does not arise. There would be no use of an Upper House, if it did not exercise, when it thought proper, the right of opposing or amending or postponingthe legislation of the Lower House. It would be of no value whatever were it a mere chamber for registering the decrees of the Lower House. It must be an independent House, having a free action of its own, for it calmly considering the legislation initiated by the popular branch, and preventing any hasty or ill considered legislation which may come from that body, but it will never set itself in opposition against the deliberate. and understood wishes of the people. Even, the House of Lords, which as an hereditary body, is far more independent than one appointed for life can be, whenever it ascertains what is the calm, deliberate will of the people of England, it yields, and never in modern times has there been, in fact or act, any attempt to overrule the decisions of that House by the appointment of new peers, excepting, perhaps, once in the reign of Queen Anac - It is true that in 1832 such an increase was threatened in consequence of the reiterated refusal of the House of Peers to pass the Reform Bill. I have no doubt the threat would have been carried into effect, if needsary; but every one, even the Ministry who advised that step, admitted that it would be a revolutionary act, a breach of the Constitution to do so, and it was because of the necessity of preventing the bloody revolution which hung over the land, if the Reform Bill had been longer refused to the people of England, that they consented to the bloodless revolution of overriding the independent ?