

No. 16.
 Lord Glenelg
 to
 Sir F. B. Head,
 20th August 1836.

Enclosures.

should feel that they had sufficient Influence upon their Government to secure Attention to their Rights and Respect for their Feelings and Prejudices. I am of opinion that this Principle, if fully and fairly acted upon, would effect both those Objects. An Executive Council constituted upon this Principle would, from their Situation as confidential Advisers of the Lieutenant Governor, necessarily have great Influence in the House of Assembly. Their Weight in the Country, as well as their confidential Situations about the Person of the Lieutenant Governor, would give them great Weight with the Legislative Council, and they would of course from both Circumstances possess great Weight with the Lieutenant Governor; they would generally, if not uniformly, be in one or other House of Parliament, and would there form a Centre of Union, and, in fact, act as a sort of Balance-wheel to the Constitution. The Measures which they brought forward, as they would necessarily have the previous Sanction of the Lieutenant Governor, would come recommended, on the one hand by all the Weight of Executive Influence, and on the other by the Support of those to whom the People, both from Habit and Principle, had been accustomed to look with Confidence. The People would therefore be predisposed to receive their Measures with Satisfaction and Confidence, as the Fruit of the Advice of their Friends and the Legislative Council, as recommended by the Servants of the Crown, whose Interests as well as Duty it was to recommend nothing but what was safe as well as satisfactory to the Public. What it was not deemed wise or prudent to adopt, instead of being suffered to pass heedlessly through the Assembly, and left to be thrown out by the Legislative Council, or negatived by the Veto of the Lieutenant Governor, would be met in the first instance and resisted; because every Step that such Proposal advanced would increase the Probability of ultimate Embarrassment to the Executive Council and those whose Confidence they enjoyed, who would of course be always the most powerful Party in Parliament. Such an Executive Council would necessarily feel a moral as well as political Responsibility for the Success of their Measures. Their permanent Connexion with the Country, as well as a Sense of Duty and natural Desire to retain Office, would necessarily insure their utmost Exertions, not only to procure Harmony but to produce good Government. The People, when they saw that the King's Representative would not retain Men in his Councils who had forfeited their Confidence, would be the more careful in the Exercise of the elective Franchise, and far less likely to withdraw their Confidence from those in whom they had once found Reason to place it. That the Adoption of this Principle would, without vesting the Election of the Executive in the People, place in their Hands such an indirect Influence upon it as would be sufficient to secure Attention to their Rights, Feelings, and Prejudices, is sufficiently evident; because, if such Attention were not paid by those in the Confidence of the Lieutenant Governor, the People would have only to return to the next Parliament Men who would not give them Parliamentary Support, and they would necessarily have to resign, and the Lieutenant Governor to appoint others who possessed the Confidence of the Representatives of the People; A. B. and C. would go out of Office, and D. E. and F. would come in, the Lieutenant Governor always retaining the Power of calling into action his superintending Control with respect to the Measures of both the one and the other; and the Effect produced upon the Interests of the Mother Country being none other, than that the Change would give Satisfaction, and, at least most probably, ensure good Government in the Management of the internal Affairs of the Colony.

But it will be said that even under this System Collision may arise. The Lieutenant Governor may disapprove of the Measures recommended by his Council, and find it impossible to form an Executive Council which could secure Parliamentary Support upon any other Terms than Concession, or the Executive Council may find it impossible to bring the Two Houses to an Understanding upon every Measure. To which I reply, that the practical working of the Principle would be sure to postpone such Collision to the latest possible Period. That the intermediate Steps of a Change of the Executive Council, and of appealing to the People by a Dissolution, would at all events give the Home Government the great Advantage of not itself coming in collision with the People till the last Moment, and of ascertaining the exact Point where the Question of Concession would become one merely of Expediency. In addition to which I would

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