its request in situations of emergency. We took the initiative last autumn in convening a conference in Ottawa to enable countries with experience in United Nations peace-keeping operations to compare notes, to identify the technical problems that have been encountered, to pool their experience in meeting those problems and to see how, individually, we might improve our response to the United Nations in future situations requiring the services of an international force.

Whe are confronted at the moment with a situation in which the whole future peace-keeping capacity of the United Nations is at issue. We are giving that problem a very high priority and we shall do what we can to see that it is resolved without detriment to the part the United Nations has played and must continue to play in the maintenance of world peace and security.

I turn next to the nuclear arrangements within the Alliance. The basic problem which is facing us here, as I see it, is how to adjust those arrangements to the changed conditions of today. Put in practical terms, the problem is how we can achieve a greater sharing in the military direction (which is to say, in the nuclear strategy) of the Alliance without further proliferation of control over the use of nuclear weapons.

One way of tackling this problem has been the suggested creation of a Multilateral Nuclear Force. While we appreciate the reasons for the MLF proposals, we decided, in the light of our other commitments, not to take part in the discussions on this force. More recently, the British Government has put forward proposals for a somewhat more broadly-based Atlantic Nuclear Force comprising nuclear forces already in being as well as those still in the planning stage. Proposals which have as their basis an inherent Atlantic conception and which relate to forces in being, thereb possibly affecting Canadian forces on both sides of the Atlantic, are naturally of more direct interest to us. We believe that discussions on any new nuclear arrangements should be held in the NATO forum on as broad a basis as possible. We also welcome the indication by the United States of its willingness to consider proposals that meet the legitimate needs of other NATO countries. We, for our part, have suggested that one approach could be to take a fresh look at existing NATO machinery and existing nucle arrangements, such as those agreed to at the NATO meeting in Ottawa in May of 1963, to identify those areas where progress may be possible towards achieving a broader basis of participation in strategic planning and the nuclear decisions of the Alliance.

 $$\operatorname{\textit{Perhaps}}$$ I can best summarize the Canadian position in this matter as follows:

- First, we acknowledge the claims of the European members of NATO to a greater and more equitable degree of participation in the nuclear arrangements of the Alliance.
- Second, we regard it as axiomatic that any new arrangements arrived at should add to the strength of the Alliance and not contribute to division within it. In particular, of course, we should be deeply disturbed by any situation in which there was an irretrievable cleavage between France and her NATO partners, given the very important character of France's contribution to the Alliance.