

for all intents and purposes, lost and that what was required was that more incentives or carrots be offered to Pyongyang. Dr. M.K. Nam, by way of contrast, felt that there was very little potential in a "carrots" approach to the nuclear impasse on the peninsula. Complicating matters inordinately was the increasing complexity of the international organizations involved, the unwillingness of United Nations members to contribute to the costs of conflict reduction, and the failure of the People's Republic of China to support the concept of U.N. Security Council sanctions against North Korea.

Various commentators flagged the importance of the perceptual dimension of the North Korean problem. How, for example, does Pyongyang view the world? Many analysts implicitly or explicitly discount the legitimacy of North Korean policies. But stripped of turgid rhetoric, these policies have a basis in legitimate concerns and perceptions. Does Pyongyang see its problems as mainly economic or military? The ways in which regional powers like Canada address the nuclear impasse depend in large part on that assessment.

And how does one assess the economic dimensions of weapons acquisitions and arms control? Ms. Shannon Selin and Ms. Janice Heppell addressed that issue in two finely documented and argued tours d'horizon; the former looked at the patterns of arms sales and acquisition in East Asia and the latter providing the backdrop to the major security issues in northeast Asia. There appears to be a clear nexus between economic growth and weapons acquisition. Arguably the North Korean nuclear weapons programme is perceived by Pyongyang as an inexpensive way of bridging the military gap between the northern and southern regimes; a gap that is, itself, a product of the profound asymmetry in economic performance between the two nations. Can economics be invoked to resolve the nuclear dilemma on the peninsula? Can an infusion of capital in the form of trade and aid provide a beleaguered state like North Korea with a sense of assurance sufficient to make it willing to abandon the nuclear option?