

issues remain: first, the Register does not include procurement through national production or advanced production technology; second, it does not take into consideration the security interests of member states; and, finally, it does not include all types of weapons (e.g. weapons of mass destruction).

Wulf also relates the findings of the 1992 Panel of Experts convened to improve the Register. Included in the analysis is the debate on the modification of the Register's seven weapons categories (battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles and missile launchers).

Wulf maintains that the Register's development has been modest. Several structural weaknesses remain: first, due to its limited scope, the Register will not significantly facilitate a judgement about the military capacity of participating states; second, as a result of its voluntary nature, it will not restrict the transfer of arms, merely record them; and, finally, it contains no formal verification mechanism. Despite these difficulties, the Register "...could well be a success due to its novel approach" (p. 544). Its future development depends on governments' sincerity and willingness to participate. If it is properly developed, the Register will provide a basis for dialogue and a foundation for further arms control measures.