

(Mr. Morel, France)

Secondly, these problems of method are very important. These are not secondary issues. For each of the major topics and each of the groups that I have mentioned, we can see how important the problem of method is. I have spoken of verification arrangements. We are having to consider verification methods which have no precedent or equivalent, and cannot have any. Hence the importance of dealing properly with these problems of method. Similarly, at the legal level, we have to cope with apparently contradictory arguments, each of which has its own *raison d'être*. We must take them into account. With regard to institutional aspects, all the delegations recognize the complexity of the arrangements to be made for the organization of the Executive Council, for example, each of them, of course, having its own preferences; but at least one thing is clear - that everybody recognizes the complexity of the method that we must find to ensure suitable representation, and satisfactory decision-making procedures in the Executive Council. As for the chemical annex, let me sum up the problem. It is a question of managing to combine the constraints relating to the security of States with those relating to industrial production. Two separate worlds, two value systems, two series of criteria to be put into a single document in a compatible way.

Finally, with regard to Group No. 5, security and trust among partners cannot be determined and decided upon in a day. We have to proceed by stages. The idea of the period of transition is obviously a key element of the convention, and there too we will have to determine very precisely the best method. It is therefore important, on the methodological level, not to minimize the differences between delegations, but to note that it is a question of jointly taking charge of a situation which is difficult to grasp.

My last comment concerning method will be as follows. I think that the common search for common solutions to unprecedented problems is already well under way - that is the general spirit of the assessment I have tried to give you. Simply, we must base ourselves on the actual situation and not on ready-made formulae; it is better for things to be stated clearly, since it is from that moment that the real negotiating work begins. In conclusion, I am tempted to quote a well-known Latin tag, labor omnia vincit improbus - "never-flinching labour proved lord of all", as Virgil put it in the *Georgics*, which constituted in a way his hymn to the land. But man is more changeable than the land, and negotiation is less predictable than ploughing. Nevertheless, I believe that while taking into account the element of unpredictability and the difficulty of the common effort, we have, with the general political guidelines, everything we need to demonstrate the political will of the international community. In these circumstances never-flinching labour should indeed enable us to achieve a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. There is much at stake; this is one of the means whereby we must jointly seek to master one of the aspects of the evolution of the contemporary world at the frontier of technology and security. We must continue the work under way and commit ourselves more and more to negotiation. This will clearly have direct consequences for the future organization of international security.