

ceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. If, for example, providing the military situation is stabilized, there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations—possibly covering more subjects than Korea—in which the Chinese Communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement”.

One week later, a group of Asian and Middle Eastern countries submitted two resolutions to the Political Committee proposing a course of action along the lines suggested by Mr. Pearson. The first, known as the thirteen-power resolution, recommended that a special group of three, including the President of the Assembly, Mr. Nasrollah Entezam, be established to “determine the basis on which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged”. The second, sponsored by twelve powers (the Philippines did not join in sponsorship), recommended the appointment of a committee to draft plans for a “peaceful settlement of existing issues in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations”. The Political Committee agreed to give priority to the cease-fire resolution, which was approved on December 14, by a vote of 52 to 5 (Cominform bloc) with one abstention (China). Mr. Pearson and Sir Benegal Rau of India were named as the two other members of the Cease-Fire Group.

The initial Chinese Communist and Soviet reaction to the cease-fire proposal offered little hope for its success. Both Mr. Malik and Mr. Wu made it clear that the proposal was not acceptable, demanding instead the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea in accordance with a Soviet draft resolution of December 9. This resolution had not specified whether “foreign troops” included the Chinese Communists. The impression left by Mr. Malik’s remarks was that they did not, although he implied that the removal of United Nations forces would make it easier to arrange for the departure of Chinese “volunteers”. At his press conference on December 16, Mr. Wu flatly rejected the cease-fire proposal as a trap to permit the building up of United States strength in Korea. He also stipulated the withdrawal of United States protection from Formosa and the seating of Chinese Communist representatives in the United Nations as conditions precedent to any negotiated settlement in Korea.

Despite these discouragements, the Cease-Fire Group proceeded with its task. As a first step, it consulted representatives of the Unified Command regarding a reasonable basis for future discussion. From this there emerged, among other proposals, suggestions for the establishment of a demilitarized area approximately twenty miles deep above the 38th parallel and for the supervision of the cease-fire by a United Nations Commission. On December 16, the Group sent Mr. Wu a message, repeated by cable to Peking, offering to discuss cease-fire arrangements with the Chinese Communist Government or its representatives in New York or any other “mutually convenient” place. On the same day, Mr. Entezam transmitted to Peking through the Swedish Government a request that the Chinese Communist delegation be instructed to remain in New York for discussions with the Cease-Fire Group. Finally on December 19, the Group assured the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister that it was the clear understanding of the Group and of