

as heavily laden with political considerations as the operations in Cyprus and the Congo. There is also the problem of the meaning of "the use of force in self-defence", when a strict implementation of the mandate by the officer in the field may elicit armed action by the party concerned.

It was the frequency of such incidents involving the use of force, the extensive and rugged terrain that had to be patrolled and the delicate and sometimes dangerous tasks to be performed that persuaded the Secretary-General, after his personal tour of the area, to ask the Security Council to increase the total strength of the force from 4,000 to 6,000, a request that was granted on May 3. Fiji, Iran and Ireland agreed to provide the additional forces. The Secretary-General also requested troops from Romania and several other East European states. Refused in each case, he was at least able to report to the Security Council that he had made every effort to achieve "balanced composition" for UNIFIL.

Political considerations

As UNIFIL met with resistance in the field in its effort to deploy its forces throughout the area from the Litani River to the Israeli border, and with continuing difficulty in the fulfilment of the other aspects of its mandate, much of the UN activity was concentrated at the political level. General Siilasvuo, General Erskine, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim and his Under-Secretary, Roberto E. Guyer, in various visits to Beirut, Damascus and Jerusalem, used their considerable skills in prevailing on Lebanon, Syria, Israel and the PLO to co-operate in enabling UNIFIL to fulfil its mandate. Pressure was put on Yasir Arafat to withhold hostile action in the southern sector. The French Ambassador in Beirut also held discussions with Arafat to the same purpose. But perhaps the most convincing pressure came from Syria, which, though it was party, with the PLO, to a mutual defence pact and was opposed to Israel in every way, placed a ban on movement of troops and material assistance to the PLO in the southern sector. Arafat agreed to comply, and arrangements were worked out to avoid incidents.

Heavy pressure by the United States and the United Nations was also brought to bear on Israel for rapid and complete withdrawal. On April 6, Israel finally agreed to a staged withdrawal. The first stage was completed by April 14 in the eastern sector, south of the Litani River and adjacent to the Golan Heights. But the pace was slow. In consequence,

Kuwait, acting in the name of the Arab countries, insisted that the Security Council meet and take a tough position on the slowness of the Israeli withdrawal; at the same time, the United States raised the question of Israeli contravention of agreements by using American arms in the invasion of Lebanon; and the Secretary-General issued his third appeal for a rapid and complete withdrawal. Israel responded with a further withdrawal by April 18 from positions comprising 65 per cent of the area of original occupation. Elements of the Senegalese, French, Iranian and Swedish units took over this area. On June 13 the Secretary-General was able to report that all Israeli forces were out of Lebanon and the first phase of the mandate had been completed. But the return of the territory to effective Lebanese authority was still a matter to be resolved.

In its withdrawal, Israel did not hand over to UNIFIL its positions along the 60-mile Israel-Lebanon border, but instead handed them over to Major Saamun Haddad's Christian Maronite force, with which Israel maintained friendly and operative relations. It appeared, for a time, that Haddad would act on behalf of the Government of Lebanon when he followed its orders and confined his men to barracks and attempted to hand over positions to UNIFIL. But other Christian elements of the Falangist Party and of the National Liberal Party refused to accept these orders and denied UN entry. They feared that UNIFIL would permit the return of Palestinian elements and, in fact, Israel charged that hundreds of armed PLO terrorists had clandestinely returned to the south and that UNIFIL had permitted the transfer to them of food and other supplies.

Though its forces were strategically stationed throughout the area, UNIFIL proved unable to assert full control and rival Christian forces clashed around the area and the Government of Lebanon looked for a way to establish its own authority in the area. To that end the Lebanese Government declared its intention of sending in its own force by June 20. In the meantime, bloody fighting broke out in Beirut between the Christians and the Syrian troops — fighting that alternated with uneasy cease-fires during the ensuing months. Disagreement among the Christians, especially between the Falangis and the Chamounists (who support the Maronites in the south), also erupted into open hostilities. Finally, on July 31, the Lebanese Government did send elements of its reconstituted military forces into the south to replace the Maronite militia.

Syrian ban on movement of assistance to southern sector