gal meiendments would ever be ratified by the oposa o-thirds of ICAO member states neces-

to be y to bring them into force.

ailable To bring a modicum of order and comered in commitment out of this confusing arof vary of proposals, Canada and a number of multier countries tried to promote the idea within a "package approach" whereby a new providernational convention, along the lines ons (athe Nordic proposal, would be approved to su the diplomatic conference as a more to be nediate measure (since the convention roposiuld come into force after ratification by ier Clairly limited number of states), and endments would be approved to the ice ak**icago c**onvention as a longer-term meadd pm**e. Unf**ortunately, however, so many conveparate interests were working at cross ould poses at Rome that it proved imposextrale to gain enough support for any type es exe naster plan.

Hagu, As if there were not enough elements to extiking against a successful outcome, the were straw was provided by the intercepa preth on August 10, 1973, of a Lebanese not will airliner by Israeli military aircraft. f haver this subject was added to the Rome escapenda, time, which could have been used ad fled framine and to negotiate the proposed ot to rendments to the Chicago convention, to ext taken up at the beginning of the extroductionary assembly in censuring Israel. ention reover at the request of many states, diplomatic conference devoted a great ugh in cal all of time to considering unsuccessfully the Hague and Montreal conventions t the ld be amended to cover "state acts" of awful interference with civil aviation pposal her than, as at present, just "state istance to the acts of individuals". t the A

Considering the disappointing results hatic the Rome meetings, was all the energy nent t ended unsuccessfully to achieve a "joint terror on" convention worth the effort? On ince, my conclusion is that it was. All ce was diplomatic activity, representations f prop publicity, as well as the useful presexerted by influential and interested oposal ups such as the pilots' associations, zerlanded many governments that might for the erwise have been content to pretend the approblem did not exist to stand up and tion bounted.

on, the Most important, a number of states,

ch may not have previously intended o com lo so, have contemplated or are now ir two emplating positively the ratification olving he three existing international conven-The ! s. It is easy to say, at this point, that relied e is less pressing need for new intercemen onal machinery for taking "joint acention; against states assisting hijackers ovide that most states seem ready to accept eared lamental international obligations by

that

ratifying existing international conventions. This encouraging development, however, was not apparent until very recently, and is attribuable, to a great extent, to the train of events and difficult choices triggered by the original Canada/United States initiative. It can at least now be said that practically no state is hospitable to hijackers. Recent incidents show that hijacked planes have to wander from state to state before finding even a semi-haven.

In the North American context, increased security measures have undoubtedly been the most important single factor in the dramatic decrease of incidents. Also significant, however, is the deterrent effect of the bilateral hijacking agreements entered into separately with Cuba on February 15, 1973, by Canada and the United States (followed on June 7, 1973, by the bilateral agreement between Cuba and Mexico). Canada first proposed the negotiation of such a bilateral treaty with Cuba in 1969, after the Cuban Government had announced its intention not to become a party to any international hijacking conventions but rather to negotiate bilaterally, taking into account its relations with individual countries. Well before these bilateral agreements came into force, it had become clear that a hijacker's lot in Cuba was not often a happy one. These agreements and the attendant publicity now provide clear confirmation of this fact.

It is evident that the time has not yet come when governments can relax and pretend that the hijacking problem has been solved. Incidents still continue to occur too frequently throughout the world. Governments and airlines will not be able to drop their guard in the foreseeable future. Certainly, however, the across-theboard attack on the interrelated aspects of the problem has directly and indirectly produced some positive results. As a result, individuals who might in the past have been tempted to commit hijacking and related offences now seem to be more aware that the gamble is not worth the risks, since there are very few places left where punishment can be avoided entirely. It is to be hoped that they are not now using their diabolic ingenuity to devise new methods of terrorizing innocent citizens.

(This article was written before the Arab terrorist hijacking incident which began at the Rome airport on December 17. The incident does not change the article's basic premise. Universal condemnation of the incident should spur governments to take further measures to eliminate the problem.)

Train of events, difficult choices triggered by Canada-U.S. move now mean almost no state is hospitable to hijackers