

18. The impression created on the other delegations by the United States attitude was deplorable. While it was felt that they had blundered into the impasse in which they found themselves, it was generally feared that the Conference would break up as a result, particularly after the United States attack on the Soviet. When the smoke cleared away, however, and when it was learned that the United Kingdom and Canada would sign, a noticeable feeling of relief spread through the Conference. I was told by the Secretary General of the Conference that the announcement that the United Kingdom and ourselves made at this juncture did much to rally the faint of heart.

19. The Soviet's refusal to sign is equally difficult to understand. During the closing sessions of the Conference it had been noted that no member of the Soviet bloc, including the U.S.S.R., had ever explicitly said that they were not going to sign. Although the speeches we heard on the Plan stressed that the Plan was technically unsatisfactory, they never included any declaration of outright rejection.

20. While their proclaimed minimum requirements were 800 channel hours, it is estimated that the Soviet Union was allotted more broadcasting time (700 hours) than they could possibly use at the present time. Reports of both the British and the United States monitoring services agreed on that point. Furthermore, it became obvious that the Soviet insistence on more and more channel hours was largely for purposes of prestige rather than to satisfy actual needs. For instance, demands for broadcasting time to Australia, India or Latin America at three or four o'clock in the morning could not have been made with the intention of reaching an audience, unless it were one of party faithful.

21. One is therefore left to conjecture as to why they did not sign on April 10th. It may be that they wanted to keep themselves free to disrupt international broadcasting, while at the same time proclaiming that they had been dealt with unfairly at the Conference, but there are indications that at least some members of the Soviet delegation had in mind the possibility of adhering to the Agreement at some later date.<sup>89</sup>

22. It might be well to mention a question on which there exists complete uncertainty. Does the Mexico City Agreement provide for adherence subsequent to April 10th for those nations who had not signed on that date? Mr. Pereyra, the Chairman of the Conference, contends that the wording of the Agreement (Article 3), which is far from clear, can be construed as permitting acceptance of the Agreement at any time (i.e., until June 15th), while the British delegation, who took a very active part in the drafting of the Agreement, maintain on the contrary that the right to such late acceptance is categorically denied. As the final text of the Agreement is not yet

<sup>89</sup> Ceci et les trois notes de renvoi suivantes paraissent sur le document original:

This and the following three footnotes appear in the original document:

With regard to the intentions of the Soviet [Union], it is worth noting that when the Secretary General of the Mexico City Conference, Col. Dostert, asked the Soviet delegate on the last day of the Conference if arrangements should be made for Russian interpretation at the Paris session of the Conference, opening on June 15, the Soviet delegate is reported to have replied coyly, "I think it would be a good idea to arrange for Russian interpretation." The Chairman of the Conference, Mr. Pereyra, who reported the incident to me, was inclined to interpret the Russian reply as hopeful of their eventual acceptance.