

Supply

and unilaterally freezing the deployment of land-based missiles, the Soviet Union has continued to build up both conventional and nuclear forces on a massive scale based on the Soviet doctrine of quantitative superiority.

This includes the development and deployment of the SS-20 in the European land mass and the creation of a global blue-water fleet, one of the most if not the most superior in the world. Soviet quiet renunciation of detente can be seen in a 1976 article in *Pravda* which defines detente as the expansion of Soviet influence throughout the world by all means short of super-power confrontation.

The Soviets, by virtue of their Marxist ideological precepts do not necessarily respect the same definition of terms that is generally accepted in the western world. This is a classic example of the crucial difference that the failure to understand the Soviet mind-set can make. Based on this, it is not surprising that some scholars contend that detente in fact never existed.

While the Soviet Union believes that nuclear war and its debilitating results must be avoided, they see the development of superior capabilities wedded to a strategy designed to achieve military victory and a dominant post-war position as the only rational approach to nuclear forces. Too often the Soviets are opportunists who will seize any attempt or initiative to fill any vacuum they perceive to be forming, and attempt to expand their influence throughout the globe by all methods short of war.

The Soviet buildup of military forces has been, as James Schlesinger notes, "the like of which the world has never seen." The West has suddenly wakened up and said "What has happened?" The public on all sides are not only asking what has happened but are saying, "help". That is what those 30,000 marchers are saying. They are asking somebody to do something about it because they do not want to be incinerated in an international nuclear global war. That is what we are discussing here. How do we help? How do we answer? How do we do something? What is that something that we do?

The basic thrust of the minority report is unfortunately based on well-intentioned but somewhat naive premises, and therefore arrives at conclusions that could well increase rather than decrease the risk of war.

The report concludes that "we condemn the continued arms race." Who in this House of Commons does not condemn it? Idealism is the wellspring of new initiatives and progressive hope. The minority report, the pacifists, the hawks, all are a part of a balance of a very delicate equation that may make world peace. We cannot live without any of them. It is a matter of determining what that balance will be.

If in fact this minority report were to be implemented with all of its provisions, it would appear to the majority on the committee that the possibility and probability of a nuclear war would not be decreased but in fact increased. If the possibility of nuclear war is increased, tell me where the morality stands then? If it is increased and this minority report is implemented, and there was a world war, who would be morally wrong? Not the side that advocated balance and deterrents, but the side that suggested we take unilateral disarmament decisions.

That is a position we cannot afford to take, a risk we cannot take for the moral purpose of maintaining peace in the world.

Rejecting the argument that a freeze is impractical due to the imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, as this report does, is unrealistic and simplistic. The Soviet Union, with its tactical superiority, could launch a conventional war in Europe. This would be extremely destabilizing as the United States would have to respond with strategic nuclear weapons to deter or else be faced with the unacceptable *fait accompli* of Soviet hegemony in Europe.

There has been recently much ado about the Kennedy-Hatfield proposal for a nuclear freeze. We have seen the recent demonstrations; 30,000 in Vancouver, 800 in Ottawa, Ground Zero week in the United States and earlier massive European protests, all warning about the danger of having nuclear weapons. What about the danger of not having nuclear weapons? That is equally dangerous to having nuclear weapons.

I have been talking about the danger of nuclear war for years in this House, questioning ministers for several years, and nothing has been done. I have been talking about a civil defence program in Canada, and nothing has been done. To advocate the unilateral abolition of nuclear weapons, as many groups do, would make us susceptible to coercion.

A nuclear freeze at this time would perpetuate the deficiencies in allied forces which would increase rather than decrease the risk of war. A freeze at current levels is too pat, too simple, too naive and inadequate because it is only one part of that equation which throws off the balance.

If the Soviet Union and the United States were frozen at current levels, the Soviets would have little reason to negotiate for reductions as they would be frozen in an advantageous position. This can clearly be seen in the fact that intermediate nuclear force negotiations could only be instituted over Soviet recalcitrance after NATO decided to deploy the Pershing II and Cruise missile to counter the SS-20 in Europe. A freeze will not encourage reductions because there would be no incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate from a superior position. The concept of a freeze at current levels ignores the strategic imperatives implicit in the concept of nuclear forces. Finally, a freeze on all aspects of production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons would be extremely difficult to verify.

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The report's proposal to institute a no-first-use policy would be unacceptable for two reasons. First, NATO's flexible response doctrine encompasses first-use, not first attack—and, Mr. Speaker, there is a big difference between first use and first attack—to counter an impending conventional rout in Europe by overwhelmingly superior Soviet forces.

Second, the treaty would not be an effective deterrent, but rather a useless scrap of paper if a nuclear scenario should ever arise as a contingency. A no-first-use treaty would not in any way, as the report contends, contribute to "a great increase in