

has not been lost on some of those who have been its strongest advocates. Hence, their recent efforts to clarify what the policy actually stands for.

One of Evan's chief advisors on the Cooperating For Peace project has, for example, offered a Huntington type corrective to the 'cooperative security' debate, emphasising that 'cooperation' in this regard is dependent not so much upon any benign conversion among the self-interested masses, globally or regionally, but on the major Western states (and their middle-power partners) increasing their support for ruling elites in "less secure" regions of the world. The actual nature of the policy of 'cooperative security' is on this basis an exemplary neo-Realist one, which seeks the enhancement of "dominant economic processes" in regions where problems of diversity and difference might hinder the homogenisation/convergence project. This, it is acknowledged, might "generate internal injustice and regional disparities", but regrettable as this might be the fact remains that "politicians and private decision makers are more likely to be persuaded by common security arguments if they are seen as good for business".<sup>50</sup> Whatever else might be said of these candid observations, they illustrate, as Michael Sullivan has noted, that stripped of its new age rhetoric the 'cooperative security' perspective outlined in Cooperating for Peace and articulated at the forefront of Australian foreign policy in the 1990s, actually "differs little from traditional realist discourse on the national security state" primarily because it is interested above all in "state security" via capitalist elite control rather than "people security".<sup>51</sup>

Affirmation of the narrowness of the new policy agenda is provided from another, broader angle in a recent survey of attitudes towards security matters in Australia carried out by another academic adviser on Cooperating For Peace.<sup>52</sup> The most striking characteristic of this survey is its quite extraordinary disinterest in security issues that elsewhere are now regarded as absolutely crucial to an understanding of the contemporary conditions for conflict and its prevention. Most disturbing in this regard is the criteria constructed to establish what are to be regarded as 'real' security issues in the 1990s and what are not. In the former context the judgement is that "potential or actual threats of armed inter-and intrastate conflict" can be the only legitimate criteria. In the latter context, consequently, the view is taken that "there are no good analytic, policy or moral reasons for conflating such widely disparate

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<sup>50</sup>Kevin Clements, cited in M. Sullivan, "Australia's Regional Peacekeeping Discourse" op. cit. 1996:226

<sup>51</sup>See M. Sullivan, Ibid

<sup>52</sup>The advisor was Andrew Mack and the 'survey' is P. Kerr and A. Mack, "The Future of Asia-Pacific Security Studies in Australia" in P. Evans ed. Studying Asia-Pacific Security (Toronto: York University Press, 1993)