Europe with an unambiguous "political vocation".⁴ It also confronts the issue of what kind of Europe would be capable of expressing such a vocation fully in political and security terms.

If the reunification of Germany was the key to the closing of a particular chapter in European history, it opened up a new one by upsetting the established balance of power. One important consequence has been the challenge to the Franco-German axis that has been fundamental to the way in which the Union has developed. The determination of the French and Germans to reach agreement has set both the agenda and largely determined the pace at which it has been dealt with. Now, as the deal over the "stability pact" on monetary union at the Dublin European Council in December, 1996, demonstrates, Franco-German agreement can be achieved only at the cost of papering over cracks that will widen and reappear later. France is likely to face an "agonizing reappraisal" over how best to further its political, security, and economic interests through the European Union in an environment in which it will be more difficult to contain Germany and at the same time appropriate German power to its own purposes. By the same token, Germany also faces difficult decisions. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's formula of pushing for greater political integration along the lines of the 1994 Lamers-Schäuble paper on European union faces not only resistance from a number of his European partners, but also from significant sectors of German public opinion. The willingness of Germans to submerge themselves in a larger European political entity is by no means as strong as the current Bonn/Berlin orthodoxy would have us believe.

What this underlines is the fact that the lines of political cleavage in the European Union do not lie exclusively along an intergovernmental - federalist dimension, with the British representing increasingly isolated intergovernmental forces. Rather, the issue is one of whether the undertaking can contain the increasingly complicated patterns of convergence and divergence that characterize the contemporary European Union of fifteen states, let alone manage enlargement to twenty or more. It is against this background that the IGC is debating what to do about the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and its implications for Canada must be assessed in the light of a process whose end product, to say the least, is unclear.

The Evolution of the CFSP:

The Hague summit of December, 1969, which must be considered among the more important in the history of the European Community, among other things called for senior national officials to "study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification, within the context of enlargement". Despite the apparently ambitious nature of the charge, the

⁴This phrase was employed in the Davignon report (1970) which initiated the first attempt to develop a common foreign policy in the form of European Political Cooperation.