

gations that became the basis of the trade-in-goods regime. International air services, for example, were governed on the basis of a series of interlocking bilateral arrangements that were crafted not only on the basis of mercantilist bargaining, but pursued in order to achieve mercantilist results. Unlike the equality of opportunity that was critical to the goods regime, the patchwork of other international arrangements was much more geared to specific outcomes. The intellectual property regime embedded in the arrangements administered in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) relied on comity rather than enforceable contract.

In the six rounds of multilateral trade negotiations between the provisional entry into force of the GATT in 1948 and the completion of the Tokyo Round in 1979, there was no significant change in this fundamental architecture. The focus of each negotiation was the reduction of tariffs on industrial goods through mercantilist bargaining. While the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds expanded negotiations beyond tariffs to the development of disciplines on export and internal subsidies, the application of countervailing and antidumping duties, and separate agreements on trade in civil aircraft and government procurement, the results were fully consistent with the principle of negative prescription<sup>10</sup>. In two areas of the Tokyo Round, however, there was already evidence of the pending shift in the centre of gravity from negative prescription to positive rule-making. Agreements governing customs valuation and technical barriers made a tentative start at requiring adherents to administer regulations along specified lines. Neither agreement, however, required countries to impose a tariff on imports or to maintain a products standards regime.

The Uruguay Round fundamentally altered the nature of the GATT-based trade relations system<sup>11</sup>; In addition to some ma-

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<sup>10</sup> For an analysis of the Tokyo Round, its origins, its objectives, issues and results see Gilbert R. Winham, *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

<sup>11</sup> For a useful summary, see Jeffrey J. Schott, *The Uruguay Round: An Assessment* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 1994). See