

Japanese and South Korean Positions

Both Japan and South Korea acknowledge that a CTBT is an effective measure to prevent the development of new types of nuclear weapons and to hinder modernization and mass-production of such weapons. Therefore, they maintain a firm stance on a CTBT that it should ban all kinds of nuclear explosions including peaceful ones even by the nuclear weapons states. However, if such a ban cannot be achieved, they demand that all peaceful explosions should be open to international inspection. For a better verification mechanism, the two countries argue that the international community needs to cooperate in the development of test monitoring technology.

V. CUT-OFF CONVENTION

Background

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed a ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Russia reiterated that position at the Conference on Disarmament on August 17, 1993. A month later, in an address to the UN General Assembly on September 27, 1993, President Clinton proposed the negotiation of a multilateral convention, known as the cutoff convention, to achieve such a ban. Pushed by the two nuclear superpowers, the UN General Assembly called for an international support for a production cut-off on December 16, 1993, by adopting a resolution which calls for a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.²⁷

At present, international cooperation for containing the spread of nuclear technology and materials is based on informal agreements, such as the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), Zangger Committee (established in 1971 with 15 major nuclear export countries and created an updatable "trigger list" of nuclear materials and equipment), and the fourteen original member of Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG),²⁸ which restricts the transfer of certain technologies in all aspects of the fuel cycle to states with unsafeguarded programs.

In April 1992, in Warsaw, Nuclear Suppliers Group agreed to extend the scope of nuclear supplier controls:

- a. Certain kinds of dual-use technology should be subject to export controls through national legislation.

²⁷ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Resolution and Decisions*, 48th Session, Resolution 48/75, Part I, pp. 120-121.

²⁸ In 1974 the "London Club" of nuclear technology and materials suppliers nations, including France as a non-party to the NPT, was convened and drew up guidelines (the so-called "London Guidelines"), and published the guideline in 1978. Their key elements were that they were to apply to nuclear facilities and their components, and that "restraint" was to operate in the export of "sensitive" technologies.