UN rapid reaction capacity is thus flawed in this regard, but the seeds for much of its solution are planted and flourishing in DPKO. The question to be answered, is whether even fully resourced, if the Standby Unit is best placed and able to meet <u>all</u> of the standby arrangements needs of a rapid reaction peace-keeping force.

Provided with sufficient personnel, DPKO's Standby Unit has the ability to develop and administer all of the central standby functions necessary for normal peace-keeping. This includes the critical role of an inspector-general to ensure that standby units meet all required standards. What the Unit will continue to have difficulty with, is the political dimension of galvanizing countries into actually providing the troops when the time comes. To a large degree this task lies at the political level and is inherently part of countries' political will.

Countries' comfort level in allowing their standby troops to join a mission, is a factor that plays a determining role in their decision. This factor is even more critical when there is a need for rapid reaction and there is limited time to convince nations through lobbying and logic. However, if national units have been in regular contact with the individuals under whom they will be serving, they will have created some ties that bind. If those national units in turn assure their political masters that they are comfortable with a particular peace-keeping deployment, this will substantially increase the comfort level of those same political masters and their inclination to authorize their national unit's deployment.