

provide few or no resources to the military, but instead rely on its police forces for internal security, Costa Rica being one such example. In either case, while the type and nature of arms required will vary considerably from nation to nation, as will the roles in which these arms are employed, there continues to be a demand for conventional weapons to meet these self-defined security needs. It is within this context that this chapter and the next examine the global and Canadian arms trade.

As noted in chapter two, changes in the global security context since the end of the Cold War have led policy-makers into uncharted waters. The Cold War ideological and political divide provided a clear rationale for national defence efforts. The superpowers extended their hegemony to those areas where their national interests were considered to be at risk or challenged. The alignment of other nations with one or other superpower camps provided a *de facto* stability: smaller nations received protection, but were constrained by superpower goals and objectives to shape their defence policies to a variety of joint defence arrangements.

With the demise of the Cold War and the reduced risk of global conventional or nuclear war, the former superpowers have turned their attention to dealing with more pressing domestic concerns. One consequence, however, is that many smaller nations previously protected by their respective superpower umbrella now find themselves confronting old enemies or former adversaries on their own, and are adjusting their defence and security policies to these changes. Recent changes in security policies in East Asia provide one example of this. Hence the rethinking and redefining of security that is under way does not always transcend the logic of self-help, and indeed, the security situations of many states have become more fragile.

The second general consideration, which gives practical content to the self-help imperative, is the drive for autonomy and self-sufficiency that conditions many states' participation in the global arms market. Many

FIGURE 3.1

The Political Context for Efforts to Constrain Conventional Proliferation

- the self-help imperative drives states to acquire defence capabilities; the security dilemma of worst-case planning leads to suspicion and renders cooperation difficult
- many states pursue autonomy and self-sufficiency in defence production, which creates pressures to export and/or stockpile weapons
- the achievement of significant reductions in nuclear arsenals and the increased significance of regional conflicts has pushed conventional weapons higher on the foreign policy agenda of many states
- the shift from mainly unilateral or informal multilateral constraint efforts to formal multilateral measures has dramatically complicated efforts to constrain conventional proliferation

¹(...continued)

to 50 percent) of its industrial output. Figures from United States, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994* (Washington: ACDA, 1995), 33-35 (hereafter cited as ACDA, *WMEAT*); Keith Krause, *Arms and the State* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 164.