demonstrations of compliance. In conditions of adversarial relationships, it may still be possible to verify arms inventories, or to detect evidence of non-compliance, but it will not be easy, and will in fact be undesirable to build confidence where none is justified.

One theme common to verification and confidence-building is the enhancement of transparency, allowing trust to be established regarding the absence of threats. This demand is in direct opposition to the traditional desire for secrecy inherent in adversarial relationships, in which threats are probably very real and must be recognized. And, apart from the need to protect military secrets from potential enemies, most nations retain a jealous attitude toward preservation of their sovereignty, which generates resistance to foreign (or even agreed multinational) intrusion.

The interrelationship between verification and confidence-building is too close to treat them in isolation, and in the following paragraphs there are inevitable overlaps with the discussion of verification in the preceding chapter and elsewhere in this report.

Arms control in general, including its measures for verification, contributes to the general building of confidence regarding the peaceful intentions of various states, and verification strengthens the effectiveness of confidence-building. Nevertheless, within the realm of security matters, measures associated with the verification of agreements to limit, reduce or eliminate specific weapons systems usually can be distinguished from CBMs, whose primary purpose is to build confidence rather than to ensure the implementation of a particular agreement. However, verification can also be applied to confidence-building measures. The focus of this chapter is on the confidence-building *measures* associated with security, rather than with the general efforts to establish and strengthen confidence in the benign intentions of states.

Types of Confidence-Building Measures

Dozens of different proposals for confidence-building measures have been discussed, and many have been adopted. Most can be placed in one of three categories: information, constraint or declaratory.[2]

Information CBMs include the publication or exchange of data on the composition and equipment of forces, on defence budgets, and on defence industry, the holding of seminars on strategy and doctrine, consultations, demonstrations of equipment, exchange postings of military personnel, and establishment of standing consultative commissions and jointly manned centres for risk reduction or crisis management. An example is the Conflict Prevention Centre set up by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) in Vienna, which is intended to serve as a clearing house for exchanges of military information, including explanation of unusual military activities, and a means to expedite co-operation in the handling of hazardous incidents.[3]

An important example of this type of information is the timely notification of activities such as army, air and naval exercises (including detailed information regarding the size and types of the units involved and the locations of the activity), tests of nuclear weapons, and mobilization exercises. Invitations to send observers, and granting of adequate facilities for those who come, are additional useful measures. Also; confidence can be built by the presence of observers at out-of-garrison activities apart from exercises, at facilities such as tank parks or airfields, or in border zones. A measure of verification of information is possible through provisions for inspection instituted by the Stockholm Document of 1986.

The efficient exchange of information is dependent on reliable communications. In addition to the normal and the diplomatic means, CBMs are supported by the creation and maintenance of reliable links between

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2   James Macintosh, *Confidence (and Security) Building Measures in the Arms Control Process: A Canadian Perspective*, Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs (Ottawa, 1985), Chapter VI, pp. 68-84.

3   In 1991 the Centre attempted to forestall the upheavals in Yugoslavia, but the crisis management mechanism of the CSCE proved unable to do so, as did the political co-operation mechanisms of the European Community, Western European Union, the Council of Europe, or NATO. However, this should be charged as a failure of conflict management rather than of confidence-building. Nothing in the behaviour of the hostile factions in Yugoslavia gives grounds on which to build credible confidence.