

sphere that the U.S.S.R. enjoys an unambiguous status as a superpower. It can be argued that a natural historical insecurity regarding Western intentions gives rise to exaggerated Soviet defensive concerns.⁶ But its huge military build-up and its reliance on force and coercion as instruments of both domestic control and diplomacy suggest that Western governments would be ill-advised to view the Soviet Union as a purely defensive power. The fact is that it does represent a real threat to Western security and to Western global interests. In short, regardless of the motivations of Soviet leaders, the potent capabilities of the Soviet Union and its profoundly anti-democratic values must be treated as a threat to the Western democracies.

Collective Security and Canada's Defence Policy

Canada's postwar security policy has essentially rested on three complementary strategies: deterrence of aggression through collective security arrangements within NATO including bilateral arrangements with the United States for North American defence -- for example NORAD; pursuit of reciprocal and verifiable arms control agreements; and commitment to the peaceful settlement of international disputes through the United Nations and other appropriate agencies. The Business Council on National Issues supports these strategies. As emphasized in Competitiveness and Security, these various approaches to security are mutually supportive rather than incompatible. Thus, Canada's full participation in NATO and NORAD in no way threatens or invalidates our interests in arms control or our occasional participation in UN peacekeeping initiatives.

For the Western world, national security in the second half of the twentieth century has become synonymous with deterrence. Although subject to occasional debate within the alliance, the NATO policy of deterrence