

of China, and their respective allies. We doubt that analysts of deterrence are consciously biased. Rather, they rely heavily on data sets assembled by others which in turn were based on now outdated Western secondary sources about the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and China. Most of these analyses were done in the 1950s and 1960s, many of them at the height of the Cold War. With a few notable exceptions, they take the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China as established fact. Their authors were not predisposed to consider the possibility that Soviet or Chinese leaders may have been motivated by defensive considerations or that they did not have as their immediate objective an attack against Berlin or Taiwan. They can only explain such restraint as the result of successful deterrence.⁷⁶

In the overwhelming majority of cases identified by Organski and Kugler, the Soviet Union or China is designated as the challenger and the United States and its allies as the defenders. The Soviet Union or China challenge the United States or its allies in seven of their fourteen cases. In another three, the United States is defending a communist country against a Soviet challenge.⁷⁷ The remaining four cases pit one communist country against another or involve, by their own admission, no challenges at all. In their 1984 collection, Huth and Russett identify twenty-five post-war cases of immediate extended deterrence; in thirteen, a communist power or its protegee is designated as the challenger and the United States or its allies as defenders in seventeen cases. Huth and Russett identify only two cases in which the United States and its allies are challengers and

⁷⁶ An early and influential example of this kind of thinking was Robert E. Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957). For a critique of current thinking of this kind and its application to Soviet policy in Afghanistan, see Richard Herrmann, "The Soviet Decision to Withdraw from Afghanistan: Changing Strategic and Regional Images," paper presented at the Twelfth Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Tel Aviv, Israel, 18-23 June 1989.

⁷⁷ These three cases are the Czechoslovakian coup (1948), the Hungarian revolt (1956), and "the Second Czechoslovakian coup" [sic] (1968).