

1. THE ABM TREATY

Francine Lecours, and Jim Moore, research assistants at the Institute during 1986 and 1987. The volume has been edited by David Cox and Mary Taylor. All of the above owe a considerable debt to Doina Cioiu for typing, formatting and vigilance in the preparation of the manuscript.

Comment and enquiries about the Guide should be addressed to

The Director of Research,
CIIPS
307 Gilmour Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K2P 0P7

Both the Soviet Union and the United States undertook ballistic missile defence (BMD) programmes during the 1960s. In the United States, the BMD issue sparked a prolonged public debate. The advisability of developing BMD centred on two main concerns: the ease with which the defence could be overcome by large numbers of cheaper offensive missiles, and the possibility that BMD deployments might destabilize deterrence based on the concept of mutual assured destruction. This concept, which had become the basis of nuclear deterrence, assumes the impossibility of an adequate defence against nuclear weapons.

The ABM Treaty prohibits both sides from deploying a nation-wide BMD and limits each to two ABM deployment areas (this was amended to one area in July 1974). The intent of the Treaty is outlined in Article I:

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defence of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defence, and not to deploy ABM systems for defence of an individual region except as provided for in Article III [establishing two specific deployment areas] of this Treaty.

Extensive verification measures are provided for in the Treaty, which also established the Joint Commission on Implementation (JCI) to deal with