

Q. 3. What is the time, strength, probable character, objectives and direction of each attack considered likely?

A. 3. General

- (i) The Probable Forms and Scales of Attack on Canadian Seaports and Inland Centres, assessed by the Joint Staff Committee on 6th July, 1938, is attached as Appendix I.
- (ii) In the light of the present trend of events of the war in Europe, and the threat of war in the Far East, it is now necessary to make preparations for a greatly increased scale of attack and to build up the defences of Canada to the maximum of the country's resources in manpower and materials.
- (iii) The method by which it is proposed to prepare for the changed conditions indicated, is set forth in the Plan for the Defence of Canada, which is attached as Appendix II.
- (iv) It is pointed out that the Forms and Scales of Attack, as listed in Appendix I constitute the basis of our present defence organization in respect to the direct defence of Canada. Attacks of the order indicated, may be launched at any time. The assumption underlying these Forms and Scales of Attack is the existence of a Supreme British Navy in the Atlantic, and a Supreme United States Navy in the Eastern Pacific.
- (v) The development of our present defence plans to meet a maximum scale of attack, including the possibility of a major scale invasion of our East Coast, rests upon the possibility that the defensive screen now provided by the British Navy in the Atlantic, may not be effective in the future. Should this eventuality arise, it can be assumed that the liquidation or destruction of British naval power could not be accomplished without very serious losses to the opposing German and Italian Navies. It is probable, therefore, particularly so in view of the severity of our winter and the clearly expressed policy of the United States regarding the defence of the Western Hemisphere, that a major scale invasion of Canada's East Coast could and would not be attempted until the Summer of 1941.
- (vi) In the meantime, namely in that period between the possible liquidation or destruction of British Seapower and the launching of a major scale invasion against our East Coast, raids of a more serious nature than those set forth in Appendix I must be expected. If we are to meet these raids successfully and with our own resources, we shall need the co-operation of the United States in the way of releasing to us, on purchase or loan, of certain equipment for our sea, land and air forces. Our present shortage of naval craft, aircraft and army equipment of all kinds is most serious.

¹ Non reproduct.

¹ Not printed.