

The difficulty confronting democratic constitution-makers is to reconcile continuity of administration with the effective control of the people. So great has been the fear of establishing a permanent ruling class, and so powerful the last for office in democracies, that in republican Rome, as in the United States to-day, all occupants of the higher civil posts were appointed for such short periods that efficiency suffered for the sake of the principle. With urban Rome the disadvantage was not as acute as it has proved in the complex organisation of the United States. Even Rome, when it ceased to be limited to the seven hills, was compelled to discard methods which are suitable only to small communities. It is hard to believe that in the United States to-day the whole upper third of the service holds office only from one general election to the next, a change of Government necessitating wholesale dismissals and fresh appointments in every department but one. That such a democratic system is incompatible with serious efficiency is obvious to all, and to none more than our cousins themselves.

Contrast with this the British method as epitomised in a recent issue of our contemporary, *The Civilian* of Great Britain: "British love and genius for compromise is demonstrated in few things so clearly as in the gradual and delicate manner in which the structure of a democratic constitution has been superimposed upon a foundation of aristocratic traditions. We recognize that the science of administration calls for specialization and life-long training as strongly as any other department of knowledge; therefore we choose young people of general ability, teach them their work, and depend on them to devote the remainder of their lives to the million and one details of modern government. To prevent such a system developing into the horrid alternative of a hide-bound bureau-

cracy, we secure that the Heads, but the Heads only, of each branch should represent the ever-changing movements of the popular will. These are the Ministers, responsible to the people's representatives in Parliament, and these again are ultimately responsible to the electoral constituencies. Such a system is designed to obtain the employment of professional experts, the economic division of labour, and the prevention of government by one clique. It is not perfect, but its greatest advantage is its ability to respond to every movement tending to perfection. We do not desire to go back to the parish policy of old Rome, or to imitate either the unfettered graft of modern America, or the over-fettered graft of Imperial Russia. Our own system might be described as Lincoln described certain vital sentences in the Declaration of Independence, "a mixture of idealism and sound common sense." Nearly every Englishman believes in his heart that no foreign government, be it called autocratic or democratic, can approach his own in its response to that great touchstone, common sense. Utopia, the Heaven on Earth, is too far off for us to see which of the nations' paths tend to converge in that direction, but most of us are content to regard our own as being not very far from the main track."

"AMENDED, NOT IMPROVED."

This latest amendment of the C. S. Amendment Act is a parliamentary act of injustice to the clerks in the Third Division of the inside service. This army of workers, composing the majority of inside civil servants, who can only gain promotion to the Second Division through the open competitive examination, or by means of an exceptionally hard non-competitive examination, in accordance with the regulation of the