

is not a rule of law that accomplices must be confirmed in order to render a conviction valid, but it is usual in practice for the judge to advise the jury not to convict on such testimony alone, and jurors generally attend to the judge's direction, and require confirmation, but it is only a rule of practice." In 1 Wharton's Cr. Law, § 783, the author states that the preponderance of authority in this country is that a jury may convict a prisoner on the testimony of an accomplice alone, though the court may at its discretion advise them to acquit unless such testimony is corroborated on material points, and numerous authorities from different States are given in support of this statement. In Pennsylvania, the statute establishes a different rule. If the credibility of the accomplice be otherwise impeached, it is ground for new trial. *People v. Haynes*, 55 Barb. 450.—*Albany Law Journal*.

**THE LATE MR. WELLES.**—Gideon Welles, ex-Secretary of the Navy, who died recently, studied law in the offices of Chief Justice Williams and Judge Ellsworth, of Connecticut, and was admitted to the bar, but he was never engaged in active practice.

**EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED.**—A short time ago a bill was introduced in the English Parliament, the object of which is to permit the questioning, on oath, of persons accused of crime, and the motion for its second reading gave rise to an extended discussion. The arguments advanced for and against the bill were exceedingly able, and show that those members who took part in the debate have made themselves familiar with the subject. The advocates of the measure contended that the result following its adoption would be the surer conviction of the guilty and the greater chance of escape of the innocent. That an innocent prisoner of intelligence would be benefited was admitted, but it was claimed that the proposed law would change the onus of proof from the prosecution, where it now is, to the defence. The bill provides that a refusal of the accused to testify shall not create a presumption against him, but as the inference to be drawn from the prisoner's action must be drawn by a jury, it was alleged that this provision would amount to nothing. The opinion of the chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals is that "the change has not given very

great satisfaction" here, and that of the Chief Justice of New Jersey, that, while the "system, with respect to the elucidation of truth, has worked well," it has led to a great amount of perjury, was quoted in opposition to the measure. The prospects of the success of the bill seem remarkably good, as it was passed to a second reading by a majority of 109. The result of an experiment of a similar character, made here, has proved satisfactory, and we are confident that very few would wish to have the old rule restored. The law may, indeed, sometimes work harshly in this way. When a prisoner is put upon the stand to testify, the prosecution is able, under pretense of impeaching him as a witness, to introduce testimony in relation to his character. Thus it is dangerous for a person whose reputation has been bad to testify in his own behalf. But if he does not testify, the jury, in a doubtful case, are inclined to infer guilt, though the statute contains a provision that refusal to testify shall raise no presumption. This, however, is considered a minor evil, as it affects only those who have by their course of life deprived themselves of public sympathy. To an innocent person of previous good character, accused of crime, it is a very great advantage and undoubtedly reduces to almost nothing the chances of conviction in such cases. That the guilty are much more frequently convicted than in former times is also very certain.—*Albany Law Journal*.

#### QUEBEC.

**COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH, QUEBEC.**—Feb. 22, Hon. Atty.-Gen. Angers introduced a bill to amend Chap. 77, C. S. L. C., respecting the Court of Queen's Bench. The object is to enable the Court to sit longer on the Civil Side. To carry out this object it is proposed to appoint a sixth Judge.

#### RECENT UNITED STATES DECISIONS.

**Trial.**—The want of any record of an arraignment, even in a capital case, is not error, if the record shows a plea of not guilty; otherwise, if it does not.—*Early v. The State*, 1 Tex. N. S. 248.

**Trade-mark.**—An official inspector of fish, who brands the packages of fish packed by him in the course of his duty with his official brand,