Separation as to property.

Marie L. Décarry vs. J. Daniel Provencher, painter, Montreal, July 17.

Hedwidge Jutras vs. François Fouquet, tanner, township of Thetford.

Margaret Eleanor McClay vs. James Alexander Breaky, farmer, township of Hatley, July 19.

GENERAL NOTES.

LYNCH LAW.—The records for the past year reveal the fact that Judge Lynch executed 144 persons—101 in the South — while there were only eighty-seven legal hangings in this country. This is a balance on decidedly the wrong side of the account. There is no lack of law and machinery for promoting the ends of justice; and a country where mob executions prevail can have no severer commentary on its intellectual and moral condition. Southern associations for the promotion of immigration into that section of the country can take no more important step for their purpose than to drive Judge Lynch from the bench in their region.—*Troy Times.*

LORD WESTBURY.—A good story of Lord Westbury, illustrating his perfect self-confidence—not to call it anything worse—seems to be omitted from the numerous anecdotes mentioned in the recently published life. He had differed from his junior in a case as to the line of argument to be taken before the court. Bethell, of course, took his own way, but received little or no encouragement from the vice-chancellor before whom he was pleading. His junior, from behind, entreated him, as a last resource, to try him with his point, which eventually was done, and with evidently instantaneous success. Bethell turned around calmly to his junior and remarked with biting sarcasm: "The silly old man actually takes your point." Another story of his brutality and rudeness to his juniors is left out. At a consultation, a junior, who evidently did not know the character of his leader, ventured to remark that the case was not such an easy win for their side as it appeared to be to Bethell, for there were some arguments for the other side. Bethell asked what they were, and, thus encouraged, the stuffsman enlarged at some length on what could be said for the other side. His leader tied up his papers and listened without any interruption till his junior had finished, when he remarked: "So that's what can be said on the other side? All I can say is, what —— fools they must be on the other side!" And turning on his heel, walked out.—*Pump Court.*

EXPULSION OF FOREIGNERS.—The current number of the *Journal du Droit International Privé* contains a paper by Mr. W. F. Craies, barrister-at-law, on the right of expulsion of foreigners from England. The general result of the examination of the authorities on the subject is that, practically, there is no such right, although, so far as international law is concerned, there is no reason why England should not expel foreigners like other nations. Mr. Craies, in view of Lord Justice Bowen's epigram that "Coke ressemble à l'ennemi de l'homme dans sa tendance à citer l'Ecriture dans l'intérêt de sa phrase," apologizes to the foreign reader for Coke and for himself in citing from Deuteronomy. There is an interesting report in this periodical of the "affaire de Buffalo Bill (William le Buffle),' in which tho right of property in a pseudonym and the legal status of Redskins in France are discussed.—*Law Journal.*

HYDROPHOBIA V. MUZZLING.—At a recent meeting held to protest against the muzzling of dogs, it was gravely stated that, since the poison resided in the saliva, it was absurd to attempt to control the spread of the disease by such a measure as muzzling. The fact that the poison could not be communicated except through inoculation by a wound was curiously enough passed over. On July 22, Mr. W. H. Smith stated in the House of Commons that it was not contemplated at present to make such a general order for this country. Surely this is following a very timid policy, for, although the metropolis and its vicinity enjoy the unenviable distinction of furnishing the greater number of cases of rabies, it is useless to expect any permanent reduction in the mortality from hydrophobia unless some extensive application of muzzling be enforced. No doubt such an order would require great care in its enforcement, but the newly constituted county councils have the power to see that it is properly carried out. The matter rests on the broad fact that it is only through general muzzling that hydrophobia can be prevented. It may be as well also to bear in mind that the disease may be communicated to man through other animals which have been bitten by rabid dogs; for example, there are authentic instances of hydrophobia being transmitted through the bite of a cat. Muzzling of dogs would, then, not only protect man from hydrophobia, but also other animals from rabies; and those who seem to have the interests of animals more at heart than those of their own kind may possibly be induced to reconsider the subject from this point of view.—*Lancet.*

A SHORT WAY WITH DUNS. — The United States statutes governing the transmission of 'dunning' postal cards in the mails, are chapter 394, section 2, as amended by chapter 1,039, section 3, of statutes passed by the first session of the Fiftieth Congress. The phrases of the statute applicable are 'threatening character,' 'calculated and obviously intended to reflect upon the character,' &c. The postmaster general, in his special notice to postmasters, defines as non-mailable, 'anything in the nature of an offensive or threatening dun' on a postal card.—*Albany Law Journal.*

THE PRONUNCIATION OF 'NEITHER.'—A friend years ago told me an anecdote of Thomas A. Hendricks, which illustrates his care, patience, and insight into human experience and frailties. Those who have read Mr. Hendricks' speeches, or who have heard him speak, or met with him in private conversation, know that his language was excellent and his words well chosen. Said my friend to him, 'How do you pronounce "neither"—"nether" or "nither?"' His reply was: 'It depends upon whom I am addressing. If I am delivering an address to a literary circle, to a popular assembly, or even to a political meeting, I say "nī-ther," but if I am addressing a jury, I say "nē-ther." My reason for saying "nē-ther" when addressing a jury, is that it is the more common form of pronunciation, and if I were to say "nī-ther" it might be new or sound strange to some juror, and who would probably get to thinking about the pronunciation I used, and so lose the thread of my argument.'—*W. W. Thornton, in the 'Advocate' (St. Paul, Minnesota).*