

established by long usage, custom, geography and treaties, Mr. Nehru repeated, nevertheless, his willingness to discuss minor border adjustments over which disputes had arisen. He concluded:

India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problems which history had bequeathed to us . . . had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later you have now brought forward . . . a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and, I thought, settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her southwestern border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope and this promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should essentially be a border dispute, claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been and are an integral part of the territory of India.

The revelation of the extent and frequency of border incursions caused profound uneasiness within India and more questioning by the press and Parliament of the Government's attitude toward China. The Government was criticized on the grounds that it had not taken action to maintain the security of the northern border. The clash in eastern Ladakh in late October aroused feelings to a higher pitch. It contributed to a stronger stand by the Government over an area concerning which there was more possibility of negotiation. Mr. Nehru's statements had made it clear that, while he was still prepared to discuss minor border rectifications, he was not going to abandon the McMahon Line. He had been less firm regarding Ladakh. He had continued to counsel patience and calm while warning that any new incursions would be resisted. The affair south of Kong Ka Pass, some 45 miles inside the Ladakh border, in which nine Indians were killed and ten captured, forced the Indian press and public to take stock realistically of the probable magnitude of the Chinese penetration. It appeared that the Chinese were in effective control of 75 per cent of the portion of Ladakh they claimed on their maps. There was strong criticism of Mr. Nehru for his moderate reaction to Chinese pressure. Never before had he been assailed so sharply. The *Hindustan Times* of New Delhi wrote:

Mr. Nehru has warned us against brave talk and action taken in anger. Let us warn him in turn that he may not have many more opportunities to unite the country behind him if China is allowed to go on heaping contumely and humiliation on us.

The *Times of India* attacked the Indian response to the Kong Ka clash:

Even those in complete agreement with New Delhi's foreign policy no longer can hesitate in condemning Mr. Nehru's reaction to the latest Sino-Indian border affray as totally inadequate. The Prime Minister's continued platitudes — he has again been stressing long friendship — on the subject of Sino-Indian cultural relations are a remarkable example of evasion at a time when certain unavoidable and unpalatable realities must be squarely accepted for what they are. His references to friendship . . . cannot obscure the dominating fact of Chinese aggression on Indian soil.

As much as the clash itself, the Chinese memoranda, which very quickly and efficiently reached New Delhi, helped to harden the official attitude of the Indian Government. Peking accused Indian border policemen of intruding unlawfully on Chinese territory and rejected the claim of compensation for loss of life. It also reserved the right to order Chinese troops to patrol south of the border claimed by India in NEFA unless the latter stopped sending patrols into parts of Ladakh said to be Chinese. The Indian reply therefore was couched in language