

There is in our minds no question of reward or approval. We do expect a satisfactory second draft resolution to result in the kind of United Nations action that will prevent military action in the future, and we look at this second draft resolution from that point of view, as well as from the point of view of the effect which it will have on the achievement of Israeli withdrawal.

I recognize the force of the reasons that made one draft resolution impossible of acceptance by the necessary majority in this Assembly. I hope that others will realize the force of the argument that the views expressed on the second draft resolution and, even more important, on the meaning of that draft resolution, are bound to influence our feeling about the first.

Our position on these two questions has been stated already and I do not need to repeat it at length.

We agree with the view that there must be a full implementation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949, and that there must be a formal affirmation by the Governments concerned that they desist from raids and incursions across the demarcation line and take active measures to prevent these things happening. The Secretary-General, in his report, has called for these things. But they are not enough. The United Nations must take action to achieve as well as merely to proclaim these objectives; to secure and supervise arrangements to this end.

We have at hand an agency of the United Nations, our own agency, which can be used effectively for these purposes if we so desire. If we do not use it—the United Nations Emergency Force—all our work of last autumn will have been wasted, and our failure will extend far beyond this particular situation and will weaken, perhaps even destroy, the value of this Assembly for the supervision of and making secure the peace. The Security Council, in present circumstances, has become futile for these purposes. Is the Assembly to go the same way? It is for us to decide, and what we do on this occasion may make the decision.

We must, therefore, in any draft resolution which we are considering, such as the one before us, be sure that we are giving the Secretary-General clear and definite authority so that, in the subsequent discussions and consultations which are required, he can make the United Nations and the United Nations Emergency Force effective for the purpose of bringing about action, following withdrawal of Israeli forces. This surely means—at least it seems to us to mean—that agreement should be reached under which UNEF can be used for keeping the peace along the demarcation line and in the Gaza strip, if necessary, and for preventing conflict—and that would be its only possible purpose in that area—in the Gulf of Aqaba or the Straits of Tiran.

We are asking our Secretary-General to take on great and additional responsibilities. I hope that this second draft resolution—

which is not a very long one—is not going to be the straw that will break this camel's back. But it is certainly our duty to give him as clear and precise a mandate as we can so that he can discharge these responsibilities with a minimum of confusion, controversy or delay.

I realize that it is the intention of the authors of this draft resolution to give the Secretary-General the authority necessary to discharge these new responsibilities and to perform this task that is of such vital importance to peace and the United Nations. I know something about the difficulties of the authors of these two draft resolutions in realizing this intention in words that will command the approval of the necessary majority of this Assembly which, after all, cannot act at all without such approval. I know that the representative of the United States, in particular, has made persistent and tireless efforts, which deserve our gratitude, to overcome these difficulties.

But, while the purpose of this second draft resolution deserves and receives the unqualified support of our Delegation, we have had—as I am sure other delegations have had, judging from what I have heard today—some doubts about the language of the draft resolution in one or two places being best suited to achieve this purpose. I would have preferred it to be somewhat more precise and more complete. I think that it would then have been more effective, if its meaning had been clearer, in achieving the two objectives which we all have in mind: immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces and, afterwards United Nations arrangements which, to use the language of the preamble of the second draft resolution, “would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions”.

I realize, of course, that it would have been impracticable to have included in this draft resolution all the details of the actions which we wish the Secretary-General and the United Nations to take. But I had hoped that the principles which we mention might have been somewhat more specific. I realize also that the Secretary-General must be given reasonable freedom of action, room to manoeuvre, in an operation of this kind, which is as delicate as it is complicated and important. But we surely do not wish this freedom to include ambiguous injunctions which might invite differing interpretations and consequent confusion and frustration.

I am assured that my doubts on this score are unnecessary and that the wording of the second draft resolution makes possible the use, for instance, of the United Nations, especially the use of UNEF, for the pacification purposes mentioned by both the representative of the United States and myself in our interventions in this debate on 28 January, and to which he referred again at our meeting this morning. I hope that this can be done, and I have been strengthened in that hope by the statement which we heard from Mr. Lodge this morning.

That statement seems to me to strengthen the validity of the interpretation which we