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present strategic situation. Today, both superpowers have a large number of high precision nuclear warheads mounted on a small number of intercontinental ballistic missiles that are fixed and thus relatively vulnerable. We feel this is an unstable situation, since the warheads may benefit the side that strikes first. That is why we should encourage the United States and the Soviet Union to design arms that are less vulnerable and threatening, as opposed to freezing their present systems.

Both parties must agree on the rules to be observed so that each side can be sure the other will honour the agreement. Statements as proposed in the resolution do not provide such guarantees. The verification provisions proposed in Sweden's and Mexico's resolution do not go far enough with respect to some freeze-related elements. For example, stricter verification procedures would be required to guarantee compliance with a ban on nuclear weapons and delivery systems production and, if possible, on fissionable material production. Nobody has been able to explain to our satisfaction how it would be possible to control to what extent a production ban might be enforced. It is common knowledge that the U.S.S.R., a freeze proponent, still rejects any kind of valid on-the-spot inspection.

The same resolution advocates as well a full ban on nuclear tests. We commend that initiative for what it is worth, but we think it falls short of the target and does not feature a provision to make it possible to resolve the issue of nuclear tests which, although conducted for peaceful purposes, might have destabilizing effects.

Canada was joint sponsor of a resolution on the urgent need for a nuclear testing full ban treaty which was adopted by the United Nations first commission: 109 voted in favour, none against, and there were 26 abstentions, including all nuclear powers. Canada's resolution strongly urges the Disarmament Conference to strike an ad hoc committee and resume immediately the proceedings on a complete ban on testing, including questions related to implementation, verification and adherence to the provisions, with a view to negotiating an appropriate treaty. It is much more direct and shuts the door which Sweden's and Mexico's resolution deliberately left ajar.

The resolution moved by those two countries also seeks a ban on fissionable material production for military purposes, but again it does not go far enough and ignores the problem of nuclear testing for peaceful purposes.

At the United Nations, Canada introduced another resolution urging—provided adequate verification means could be found—a stop of and a ban on fissionable material production intended for nuclear weapons and other explosive nuclear missiles. That resolution was adopted during the commission proceedings—125 affirmative votes, one negative vote and nine abstentions, including four out of five powers with nuclear armament. Canada's resolution therefore bridges another potentially dangerous wide gap which the Swedes and the Mexicans ignored in their resolution. It is deplorable that such

obvious gaps can still be found in this resolution on a nuclear freeze.

Imposing a freeze, as advocated in the resolution, instead of negotiating one would inevitably raise numerous and possibly insolvable problems concerning definitions, exclusions and inclusions. Besides, even if it were possible to negotiate a freeze, these negotiations would be just as difficult, complex and protracted as negotiations on reductions, and they would even detract us from efforts made to achieve a true reduction in nuclear arms levels.

As I said, all elements proposed in the resolution have already been the object of resolutions, or they are pending until valid bilateral negotiations resume. The over-all approach of arms and disarmament control advocated in the Sweden and Mexican resolution prejudices all the complex technical, scientific, political, legal and military questions involved in serious negotiations on weapons control. As proposed now, a nuclear freeze would hamper rather than pave the way for the necessary negotiations. It would introduce a factor of instability and unbalance, whereas a balanced reduction is what is needed for constructive peace promotion.

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After serious examination of the various consequences of a nuclear arms freeze, Canada decided to vote against the resolution proposed by Sweden and Mexico, as did most of its NATO allies. I should add that our six partners of the Economic Summit also joined us. These include not only the United States, but also the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and Japan.

Our vote should not be seen as a wish on our part to agree that nuclear armaments be kept at present levels or continue to increase. Rather it reflects Canada's continuing firm commitment to look for means to reduce nuclear armaments. It is this commitment, not a freeze of nuclear arms at the present levels that we view as our priority.

The Canadian Government shares the wish of mankind to be rid of the threat of a nuclear war, and it has given clear evidence of this fact. Nothing in our effort is intended to detract us from making this wish come true. Our objective is to try, not only within the United Nations, but also at every level of negotiation, to meet the goal we have set for ourselves, that is a reduction in nuclear arms.

We therefore have three major objectives in the field of nuclear arms. We believe that Canada has a real opportunity to play a positive international role, which we have already begun to develop.

The first objective is an immediate and unconditional resumption of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Canada has pursued this objective within NATO councils and at the United Nations. We continued to do so on the occasion of our most recent periodical consultations with