

lieve that if the opportunities are given for using intoxicating liquors, the necessary consequence will be the abuse of them by a very large proportion of those who attempt the use of them. In dealing with this question, I find that the community may be fairly divided into three classes—those who are already temperance people, those who use liquor without abusing it, and those who, unfortunately for themselves and for the community in which they live, abuse it. The first class it is not necessary for me to appeal to, because I believe all temperance people are thoroughly in accord with us in regard to the principle of this resolution, and will gladly and heartily endorse any legislation which it may involve. The last class, those who abuse the liquor, I think we have a perfect right, for the good of the country, to restrain from that abuse. I find, then, that it is necessary for me simply to appeal to those who use liquor without abusing it. In doing so, I shall not only appeal to their generosity and their kindness towards their fellow beings in this Dominion, in asking them to assist in bringing about what I believe to be a great good to the country, but I think I can appeal to them fairly and justly, as well as successfully, on the ground that it is also to their pecuniary and material advantage that such a resolution as this should pass this House, and that a law should be founded upon it. A great statesman has announced as a principle that it is the duty of a Government to make everything that is right easy for its citizens, and to make everything that is wrong difficult. This perhaps may be considered a self-evident proposition; but I think that we must necessarily include in it the traffic in intoxicating liquors. I would go further and say that not only is it the duty of a Government, but it is the duty of the citizens of a country, to assist in making everything that is right easy, and everything that is wrong difficult. This proposition may be stated in another form: that we should oppose national duty to national selfishness. If the community believe that what I have stated is a duty, they must sacrifice to a certain extent what I acknowledge to be their use of intoxicating liquors to the necessity of restraining the abuse of them by a large number of their fellow-citizens. And I believe, Sir, that this appeal will not be in vain; because we know, as a matter of fact, that a large number of people among those who to-day are total abstainers have not found it necessary, from their fears of the consequences of using liquor in themselves to become total abstainers, but that they have become so owing to what they believe to be the necessary effect that their continuance of the use of liquor would have by way of example upon their fellow citizens. I have seen it stated in some papers, in which the mover of this resolution has been criticised, that he did not touch a vital point in the argument—the abstract right of Parliament or of the country to prohibit the use of intoxicating liquors. I wish to discuss this contention for a few moments. Some might say that it is now too late to attempt to make any such argument as that prohibition is abstractly wrong, because we already have parliamentary prohibition; but I find that, even without agreeing in this argument at once, I can quote the opinion of one or two well known statesmen in support of my contention that this Parliament has the abstract right to enforce total prohibition. First, I will quote a short extract from Mr. Mill, a great English writer on political economy. He says:

“Even in the best state society has yet reached, it is lamentable to think how a great a proportion of all the efforts and talents in the world are employed in merely neutralizing one another. It is the proper end of Government to reduce this wretched waste to the smallest possible amount, by taking such measure as shall cause the energies now spent among mankind in injuring one another, or in protecting themselves against injury, to be turned to the legitimate employment of the human faculties, that of compelling the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical and moral good.”

Surely, in limiting or restricting the traffic in intoxicating liquors, we can fairly say we are compelling the powers of nature to be more and more subservient to physical and

moral good. I find also that an able writer, a short pamphlet of whose I have in my hand, Mr. Wm. Hoyle, a well known authority in England on political economy and other economical subjects, says:

“True civilization consists, not in the mere amassing of wealth, but in promoting such social and national arrangements as will ensure the physical health, the national development, the social happiness, and the industrial and moral progress of nations.”

If, Sir, as was shown very clearly by my hon. friend who proposed this resolution, the physical and moral health of the nation will be promoted by its abstention from the use of intoxicating liquors, we are justified, on this ground alone, in endeavouring to bring to pass the prohibition of the use of these liquors. I will cite also a quotation from Mr. Gladstone, who may, I think, be fairly called one of the greatest statesmen who has ever taken into consideration the internal economy of the greatest nation in the world. He said, in the case of Ireland:

“It was agreed that if the sentiment of the public was in sympathy with the proposal with regard to the Sunday-closing Bill, it ought to be assented to. If people were desirous to set aside this temptation, would it not be a cruel thing to refuse their desire.”

From these quotations, I argue that it is a mere question of whether the country is really desirous that the law for total prohibition should be enacted. But I will go further. We have other things in which the liberty of the citizen is just as much interfered with as it would be in such a law as this. I believe that on our Statute Books there is an Act against the carrying of concealed firearms. Nobody can pretend that, in itself, the carrying of firearms in one's pocket or in any other way concealed on the person is necessarily wrong; but for the public good it has been found necessary, in consequence of the frequency of these firearms being carried for evil purposes, that the carrying of them should be declared wrong, and there is a law against it. We have in our municipal regulations the prohibition of certain trades and certain usages in large communities; we have also, and this is, perhaps, more akin to the present prohibitory law we are advocating, stringent laws against prostitution, against the circulation and the reading of immoral literature, and also against gambling. I think that these are really fair examples of such prohibitory legislation as this for which we are asking, and that since we have in this way interfered with the liberty of the citizen, we have the right to go further and interfere with it also in the question which is now before us. But even more than this; if we examine the present law we will find that in this and other Acts in regard to the liquor traffic, we have already adopted the principle of prohibition. We find that in England and in Scotland and in Ireland there are laws against the selling of liquor on Sunday; and if it is allowable to prohibit the selling of liquor on Sunday, it is equally allowable to prohibit the selling of it on other days of the week. If it is not interfering with a man's liberty to say he shall not, on a certain day or during certain hours, go into a liquor saloon or shop to obtain liquor, it is perfectly right that we should say that on other days and during other hours, he shall not have that privilege or liberty. In our own Statute Books, there is a series of laws acknowledging the prohibitory principle. We find the Scott Act and the Dunkin Act, both of which make local prohibition right in this country. If it is right for the Parliament of this country to prohibit the traffic in liquor in certain localities it must be perfectly legitimate and right that that traffic should be prohibited over the whole country. More than this, we find there are clauses in all these Acts, even in the License Acts we have in the different Provinces, which prohibit the sale of liquor in certain times and seasons and places, and if we are not at all to interfere with the right of the individual to obtain liquor where and when he likes, we should not have passed those laws; and the passing of those laws is, I contend, a suffi-