the Department of National Defence might have to increase its activities in surveillance of the Canadian north, the detection of submarine activity in the Arctic and the control of Canada's offshore waters. The Argus long-range aircraft, the Tracker, and other existing maritime forces were to carry out these tasks for the time being, but the white paper also left open the possibility of acquiring a new long-range patrol aircraft in due course; indicated that it might be desirable to increase submarine detection capability in the Arctic; and discussed the eventual purchase of hydrofoils, fast patrol boats and air-cushion vehicles for surveillance and control operations.

Canada's contribution to the maritime defence of North America was to be made by the twenty destroyers, three support ships, four submarines and several air squadrons available at that time, the white paper indicated.3 However, the navy would shift its focus away from "anti-submarine warfare directed against submarine-launched ballistic missiles" and towards other maritime roles. These other roles were not specified, but Defence in the 70s stated:

The Government believes Canada's maritime forces must be reoriented with the long-term objective of providing a more versatile capability. Versatility is required because it is not possible to be certain precisely which maritime activities will be required and which will not, in the years ahead.5

The sub-committee points out to Canadians that the long term has arrived but the versatility has not.

The white paper dealt with Canada's commitment to NATO's maritime defence in general terms only. The Canadian government would continue to contribute to the maritime defence of the Alliance, it indicated, and to earmark ships, aircraft and submarines for assignment to NATO in the event of an emergency. Also Canada would continue to provide ships for NATO's Standing Naval Force, Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). The ships and aircraft involved in these NATO tasks would be the same twenty destroyers, three support ships, four submarines and several Argus and Tracker squadrons then employed for the protection of Canada, the defence of North America and other tasks.

The maritime contribution to peacekeeping was not specifically mentioned in the white paper, but Canada's naval forces had already been involved in the transportation and support of several peacekeeping forces by 1969, and the expectation was that this experience would be repeated if circumstances called for it. Shipment of troops and supplies in the three fleet support ships, for example, was an obvious possibility. There seems to have been no question of acquiring any specialized ships for peacekeeping operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 27. These ships and aircraft were to be multi-tasked to carry out surveillance and control duties, NATO responsibilities and peacekeeping when necessary.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup> Idem.