significance, it is worth noting as a solemn commitment for the future and as a pledge given by Communist China to the non-nuclear countries of Asia.

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What we will be watching for in the months ahead is an indication that Communist China is reacting with sober responsibility to the implications of having joined the "nuclear club". While as yet only a very junior member of that club, the Chinese should show themselves willing to assume some of the political responsibility and restraint in world affairs which characterizes the nuclear powers in their awareness of the terrible potential which they control.

For the immediate future, we may expect the Chinese posture on the international scene to be even more aggressive and arrogant than hitherto. Two contradictory forces could play upon the thinking of the Chinese leaders as their realization grows of the significance of this first step towards nuclear capability: one, an initial and not unnatural reaction of national pride and increased self-confidence, would incline them to greater truculence; the other, a gradual growth of apprehensive respect for the source of destructive power which they are acquiring, could lead them towards restraint, responsibility and prudence in the conduct of their policies. I would hope that, as time goes on, the urgings of pride and truculence will give way to a more sober assessment of the dangers of a world conflagration, an assessment which I am confident the Chinese are fully capable of making. Since their nuclear test, the Chinese have again said, in their picturesque phrase, that the atomic bomb is a paper tiger; closer contact with nuclear realities should make them realize that it is the beast of a possible Armageddon.

The aspects which I mentioned a moment ago as being grounds for regret and disappointment in connection with the Chinese nuclear test should not give rise to exaggerated concern. In my view, Chinese tests will have no immediate effect on the overall strategic balance. There is a wide gap between the ability to detonate a nuclear device and the possession of an effective nuclear capability. These facts of life will, I am sure, contribute to Chinese restraint.

I believe that the limited strategic implications of the Chinese test are generally understood. News of that test has been received with relative calm and restraint by the non-nuclear countries of Asia, and in particular by those countries which might believe themselves to be most directly threatened by a Communist China armed with nuclear weapons.

When we say that we deplore the fact that Communist China has seen fit to take the first step towards the development of nuclear weapons, we should, as a corollary, recall the position taken by other countries who have the technical and scientific capability to develop such weapons but have decided, as a matter of deliberate policy, to refrain from doing so. Canada is one of the countries to have taken that decision. India is another, and I should like to pay particular tribute to the Indian position in this matter. Only recently, and in the full knowledge that a Chinese test explosion could be expected in the near future, the Indian Prime Minister reaffirmed that position when he stated that India stands committed to use atomic energy only for peaceful purposes, and that Indian scientists and technicians are under firm orders not to make a