

it is not possible to define precisely what prompted the Soviet authorities to co-operate in concluding certain limited, tension-easing agreements, of which the partial test ban treaty is the most significant, after some years of refusing these same proposals. Doubtless a variety of factors entered into the decision. One Soviet motive may have been a desire to reduce the risk of war; for there is no question in my mind but that the Soviet people, like our own, ardently desire peace and that Cuba was a sobering lesson for everyone. Another motive was, I think, economic, since the partial test ban treaty seems likely to limit the extension of the arms race into even more sophisticated and expensive areas of development. The Soviet leaders probably also share with us a desire to discourage the dissemination of nuclear weapons under the independent control of more and more governments, a development which could vastly increase the danger of accidental war and make much more complicated, and perhaps hopeless, the prospect of achieving disarmament.

Evolution within the Communist bloc may have exerted considerable influence. In Eastern Europe the Soviet Union's allies now enjoy a greater freedom to manoeuvre than was possible a few years ago. I think this was highlighted the other day when my colleague the Minister of Trade and Commerce and I received in our offices a member of the Government of Bulgaria who had come to Canada to discuss with us matters involved in a prospective trade treaty. Although on key international issues such as disarmament and Germany and Berlin the bloc countries give apparently unquestioning support to the Soviet Union, it is nevertheless evident that on internal policy relating to collectivization of agriculture, de-Stalinization, and so on, and on bloc economic policies, there are variations which indicate clearly that differing national requirements and interests are more and more taken into account.

Moreover, there seems to be some increase in the realism of the Soviet leaders on the essential issues of Soviet-Western relations, and this realism may make possible in due course limited agreements on a number of other issues to complement and consolidate the relaxation begun by the achievement of the limited test ban agreement. The dialogue between the Soviet Union and the United States, as the leading representative of the West, has been resumed and it is to continue, as President Johnson's first message to Chairman Khrushchov indicated yesterday.

#### China and U.S.S.R.

A major factor in Soviet thinking, of course, is the problem of its relations with Communist China. While we have long known that there were serious differences between the Soviet Union and China, and that China has never been a true satellite of the Soviet Union, the new element is the unrestrained public disclosure of the extent of the rift. The dispute now appears to have been carried into the field of inter-state relations, affecting economic, political and possibly even territorial aspects. It would be unwise, of course, to judge how far these differences may yet be carried, for the sobering fact is that they are still agreed as to their basic aim, the extension of Communism throughout the world. Their differences are related primarily to the means by which this aim can best be achieved, although in the process national and racial considerations appear to have become involved.