

unprovoked aggression, whether committed by great or small powers, for what it is, and take appropriate action. This action may have to vary, however, according to circumstances.

- (b) We should never formally condemn an aggressor until the fact of his aggression is clearly proven by impartial evidence, and until the mediatory and conciliatory functions of the United Nations have been exhausted.
- (c) Condemnation of aggression should not mean that in every case economic and military sanctions must follow. The enforcement action to be taken against an aggressor must be related to the practicability of such action; to the general strategic and political situation, and to the possibility of such enforcement action weakening the peaceful and law abiding powers in other areas, thereby tempting another and a far more serious threat to the peace.
- (d) We should recognize our limitations in this way, even when condemnatory action has to be taken. There is nothing immoral in this. It is immoral, however, when passing resolutions at the United Nations condemning aggressors, to give the impression that they will be followed by strong and effective economic and military action, when we know that, in fact, such action will not or cannot be taken. It was not, for instance, the reluctance of the League of Nations to condemn the aggression of Fascist Italy against Abyssinia, which so fatally weakened that organization. That condemnation was easy and it was given in ringing and defiant resolutions and speeches. The wrong done was in giving the impression that these resolutions would be implemented, and then doing nothing about it.

If we apply these principles to the present situation in Korea, what conclusions do we reach? We were right, I think, in voting for the U.S. resolution of February condemning Communist Chinese aggression. I still think, however, it was unwise to force a vote on that Resolution until we had made a further and final effort at negotiation along lines which would have picked up Peking's ambiguous reply to the Cease-Fire group's proposals, and confronted that government with a detailed and practical programme for implementing those proposals; one which would have had to be rejected or accepted, and which could not have been used for bargaining or delaying purposes.

We were right, I think, in refusing to allow the resolution of condemnation to be followed by immediate enforcement action against the Peking Government. This would not, in my view, have been effective in ending the war in Korea; it would have been effective in extending the conflict to the mainland of China, with all the political and military consequences of such extension. I am not one of those who think that the Peking regime would soon collapse from such a conflict. I am one of those who think that Moscow would be its main and possibly only beneficiary. We should not, therefore, in my view, take any avoidable action against China or in Korea which would weaken what is still the main front of the Free World - Western Europe.

From this it follows we should continue to localize the war in Korea and end it as soon as possible. We should