

going on to try to resolve the disputes over the canal.

Epstein: Let me go back a little bit further. I had been in London that summer where the subcommittee on disarmament, the five powers, were holding their meeting at Lancaster House in London. One of the young British Foreign Office chaps who was on their disarmament delegation and whom I became quite friendly with was having lunch with me one day. This was after the nationalization of the Suez Canal. He asked me a question that rang a bell in my mind because it didn't make sense. He said, "Don't you think the Israelis might take umbrage over the nationalizing of the Suez Canal because that would prevent Israeli ships from going through the Canal?" He thought the Israelis might react. There were other grounds, too, because there had been Fedayeen and marauder attacks against Israel. The fact that he asked this about the Israelis made me take note because this was not the sort of remark one would make. It was the British and the French who had owned the Suez Canal Company and had controlled the Canal. So, why drag in the Israelis? I didn't think about it until Israel did attack and then the British and the French announced that they were going to occupy ten kilometers on each side of the canal to preserve the canal against damage from the Israeli and Egyptian fighting. That was phony as hell. Later on we learned that there was an understanding between the Israelis, the British, and the