between positivist-empirical and relativist-interpretative phenomenological approaches, ..." Later, they observe that their approach is "structurationist," contending that "just as structures are constituted by the practice and self-understandings of agents, so the influence and interests of agents are constituted and explained by political and cultural structures." (p. 371) For a manageable introduction to some of these ideas and approaches, see Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security,* Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995) and Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory," *International Organization,* Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1987).

9.   *Ibid.,* p. 374. The diffusion of ideas (including whole ways of understanding) to other states is a particularly important dimension of this understanding. There can be some confusion about whether epistemic communities are fundamentally national or transnational in character. The short answer is that they can be either at different stages in their growth. In some cases they appear to grow first and foremost as national networks, influence national policy in their own state, and then diffuse ideas transnationally. In others, the transnational character of the network may emerge earlier, before substantial influence in any particular state is evident. The latter seems more true for minimalist confidence building-oriented networks, but this will not necessarily be true in other cases. An agnostic view on this count seems most appropriate.

10.   Ibid., p. 373.

11.   The role of a confidence building-oriented epistemic community *before* this point is unclear and likely non-existent. Indeed, it seems that the initiating ideas for the original Helsinki Final Act's CBMs were distinctly operational in nature, lacked any conceptual support, and were developed primarily within government circles late in the 1950s as an adjunct to technical strategic nuclear arms control-related ideas dealing with surprise attack. Their initial focus was the 1958 Geneva Surprise Attack Conference although others emerged in the Polish Rapaki Plans of 1957 and 1958 and in a few instances of Western academic writing in the early 1960s. See Robin Ranger, *Arms and Politics 1958-1978 — Arms Control in a Changing Political Context* (Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1979), especially Chapter 20, for a brief discussion of this period. There seems to

have been little explicit appreciation of a "confidence building approach" at that time. See Johan J. Holst, "Fixed Control Posts and European Stability," *Disarmament and Arms Control* Vol. 2 (Summer 1964) for a partial exception. Also see Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe: A British-French-German Enquiry* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963) for one of the few substantial early examinations of conventional forces arms control in Europe.

12.   The author is unaware of any study that has looked into this dimension of the CSCE security experience. Because the importance of the epistemic community approach has only emerged recently in the author's own work, there has been no opportunity to explore this important subject in any depth. A study patterned on Adler's ("The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control") would be a substantial contribution to this literature.

It should also be borne in mind, however, that the epistemic community approach is much more important as a *prescriptive* element in the transformation view of confidence building than it is an explanatory element in accounting for the CSCE CSBM history. The existence of a "CSCE confidence building epistemic community" is and ought to be treated as hypothetical at present although there is adequate evidence to believe that this is at least a plausible claim.

13.   Regimes and institutions are treated as synonymous concepts in this review. John J. Mearsheimer makes this argument although this is a common practice. See "The False Promise of International Institutions" *International Security,* Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 8 (note 13).

"Regime" is used in the formal, analytic sense in this review and is derived directly from the classic source — the special regime issue of *International Organization* edited by Stephen D. Krasner (Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982)). Comparing this definition with that of institutions in the main text should support the claim that these two concepts are very similar. Krasner defines regimes as:

"sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are