

attackers to defy the next deterrent threat, whereas previous stalemates did not.

The study also examined how crises were resolved once deterrence had failed and the attacker pressed ahead. The crisis was more likely to escalate to war, and the defender more likely to fight, to the extent that (1) the defender was geographically close to the protégé and was its ally, (2) the short-term (and to some extent the long-term) military balance was in its favour and (3) it had previously followed a firm-but-fair diplomatic strategy.

Huth and Russett argued that various elements, including the balance of power, crisis behaviour and a state's reputation, all affect the success of deterrence and whether or not crises escalate to war. They asserted that avoiding war was not simply a matter of possessing great relative strength or behaving in a tough, inflexible manner.

They also discussed some differences between the first and second phase, and their impression that the variables which affected the attacker's decision to press ahead in the first phase seemed to have less influence on the defender's decision to fight once deterrence had failed. However, this did not necessarily mean that the attacker was generally wrong in its judgement of the defender; in some instances, the attacker might have inferred from those variables that the defender was likely to fight, and backed off. First, the firm-but-fair strategy is associated both with successful deterrence and with escalation to war in a crisis. This suggests that attackers who ignore firm and fair threats are likely to provoke a response. Second, long-term military balance of power is much more important to the second phase suggesting that whereas an attacker may press ahead looking forward to a *fait accompli*, it may be met with a defender capable and willing to sustain a long war. Third, the relatively greater role of alliance and geographical proximity in the second phase suggests that, while the attacker may pay little attention to the fact that the defender has both a material investment and its reputation at stake in its protégé, these factors can motivate the defender to fight back, resulting in escalation to war. Interestingly enough, the defender's possession or non-possession of nuclear weapons seems irrelevant and does not affect either the decision of an attacker to defy deterrence or that of a defender to resist attack.

To sum up, Huth and Russett's paper showed the influences which affect the development or non-development of crises after the employment of extended deterrence. Since contemporary major power confrontations are frequently fought through surrogates, this study was important in providing some insight into the probable setting of accidental nuclear war.

General Milstein commented on the papers presented by Russett, Huth and Dumas.