

options currently available to Moscow as it plans for the CSCE. If the reform trend acquired predominance in Soviet policy, what specific forms of behaviour would we expect from Moscow at the CSCE?

To begin with, the comments of officials such as Zagladin and Yakovlev suggest that in analyzing Western conduct as it related to the CSCE, Moscow should differentiate between several alternate tendencies. Foreign policy professionals in the USSR presumably have detailed and realistic (if varying) perceptions of the politics and European policy within the various Western countries and between them. The published Soviet commentary that is available to the Western analyst is however comparatively primitive. Nevertheless, three trends that correspond broadly to those observed in 1922 can readily be identified in published Soviet views of current Western policy. The first consists of an "Atlantist" tendency that is manifested in attempts to delay and sabotage the CSCE, and that corresponds to the trend to seek "military solutions" and prevent the convocation of the Genoa Conference. A second tendency exists in the form of an interest in economic cooperation with socialist countries, and is expressed in a desire to get on with the CSCE. And then there is a "realist" trend that looks to productive political negotiations at the CSCE, and resembles the activity of the "pacifist wing of the bourgeoisie" in 1922. Each of these