

were those of the Cold War, and they quickly, if not immediately, came to seem out of tune with broad Canadian opinion about Mr. Gorbachev and the pace of change in Soviet foreign and security policies. The plan to acquire a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines made the entire document controversial from the beginning. Within three years, the dismantling of the Soviet empire in Europe had made Canada's plans for a major build-up of its land forces largely unnecessary, while the state of government finances in Ottawa had led the Cabinet to scrap the proposed fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. A whole range of other planned or envisaged equipment acquisitions was dropped as well.

And so the problem of an up-to-date and sound Canadian defence policy remains. Acquiring the range of equipment envisaged in the 1987 White Paper would have entailed increasing Canada's defence budget by at least fifty, perhaps 100 percent, over time, a possibility that is no longer remotely conceivable. In fact, the likeliest prospect is that the defence budget will be reduced, or, at best, kept stable. Reductions in Canadian forces in Europe may provide some limited relief over the next three or four years, but the dilemma of matching commitments to resources is likely to be almost as severe as it was in the 1970s.

Canada should continue to play its part on the international scene through contributions to the work of NATO, NORAD, the United Nations, and other bodies promoting peace, order and security. However, this country cannot afford to respond with alacrity to every good opportunity for promoting peace and justice that might arise in the next few years. Priorities have to be established, hard choices have to be made, and all necessary attention must continue to be paid to those direct, Canadian concerns which are vital to the continued development of this country as a major, respected, sovereign power.

The relationship between front-end commitments and infrastructure needs careful scrutiny. The key task is to work towards a model of the armed forces which balances the two, and which does not lead to a defence structure consisting mainly of logistical support systems and inflated bureaucracies unaccompanied by credible fighting capability. This model should also channel available resources into forces that are likely to remain viable