

obstacles. There is every reason to believe, for example, that cognitive barriers to signalling can just as readily obstruct reassurance as they can deterrence. One of our research objectives is to identify these obstacles as well as the conditions associated with successful reassurance.

An adversary's motives are likely to be important in determining the effectiveness of strategies of reassurance. If an adversary is driven largely by domestic political needs or strategic weakness, then reassurance may be more appropriate as a substitute for deterrence. If adversarial motives are mixed, reassurance may be more effective as a complement to deterrence. When an adversary is motivated primarily by opportunity, reassurance is likely to misfire and encourage the challenge it is designed to prevent.

Determining the relative weight of need and opportunity as motivating factors of an adversary's strategic choices is extraordinarily difficult. In most cases, both are likely to be present in different degrees. This determination is critical, however, because it speaks to the appropriate mix and sequencing of deterrence with strategies of reassurance.¹³⁷ Not enough is known about the interactive effects of deterrence and reassurance in different sequences under different conditions.

We want to analyze the impact of reassurance in the context of deterrence. To do this, we intend to identify cases of immediate deterrence in which one or more reassurance strategies were also practised and to explore the relationship between them.¹³⁸ In this connection, we offer three additional propositions:

¹³⁷ Dean Pruitt and Jeffrey Rubin, *Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement* (New York: Random House, 1986) suggest, for example, that a combination of firmness and concern is most effective in managing social conflict.

¹³⁸ We recognize the possibility that those cases in which defenders practise deterrence and reassurance may differ from those in which they only practise one or the other. We propose to compare the results of the analysis with cases in which only deterrence and only reassurance are attempted.