

K8(G69)

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Proposal Abstract K8(G69)

1. Arms Control Problem:

- Nuclear weapons - comprehensive test ban
- peaceful nuclear explosions

2. Verification Type:

- (a) Seismic sensors - extra-border stations
 - international network (Article 2(2))
- (b) International exchange of information (Article 2(2))
- (c) On-site inspection - selective
 - non-obligatory (Article 2(3))
 - challenge
- (d) Complaints procedure - consultation and cooperation (Article 2(3))
 - referral to Security Council (Article 2(4))
- (e) Review conference (Article 5 of CCD/348)

3. Source:

Sweden. "Working paper suggesting possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapons tests". ENDC/242, 1 April 1969.

See also: - ENDC/PV.399, 1 April 1969;

- ENDC/PV.415, 23 May 1969;

- CCD/PV.524, 27 July 1971; and

- CCD/348, 7 September 1971 which is a revised version of ENDC/242.

4. Summary:

The aim of the original draft treaty (ENDC/242) and its revision (CCD/348) is to prohibit underground nuclear tests. Parties are also obligated to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions in conformity with international agreements to be negotiated (Article 1).

The main components of the verification system are found in Article 2. According to this provision, each party is under a general obligation to cooperate in good faith to implement the treaty (Article 2(1)). More specifically, parties are to cooperate in an "effective international exchange of seismological data" (Article 2(2)). Parties are also required to clarify any events pertaining to the subject matter of the treaty. In this regard each party is entitled to:

- (1) make inquiries and receive information as a result of such inquiries,
- (2) invite inspection of its territory (such inspection to be conducted in a manner prescribed by the inviting party), and