

START Signed

In Moscow on July 30, USA President George Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which, once ratified, will lead to a reduction in the two countries' long-range nuclear weapons.

The Treaty limits each party to a maximum of 1,600 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers, with a sub-limit of 154 deployed heavy ICBMs (only the USSR deploys heavy ICBMs). It further limits each party to 6,000 "accountable" warheads deployed on ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, with sub-limits of 4,900 on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and 1,540 on heavy ICBMs. The remaining 1,100 warheads must be deployed on heavy bombers in the form of air-launched cruise missiles, bombs or short-range attack missiles. Because the START counting rules "discount" bomber weapons (i.e., each may count as less than one warhead), each party will in fact be permitted to deploy more than 6,000 warheads.

In addition to mandating reductions in superpower nuclear forces, the Treaty prescribes intrusive verification measures, including 12 types of on-site inspection.

Canada has long regarded the successful negotiation of START as an arms control priority. We welcomed the Treaty's signature and look forward to its ratification and implementation. START will enhance strategic stability at lower levels of nuclear arms and will thus contribute to collective security. The USA and the USSR have established a working group to consider follow-on negotiations to START. In Canada's view, the objective of strategic stability should remain paramount throughout follow-on negotiations on long-range nuclear forces, and on defence and space arms.

a world where the non-proliferation of weapons and technology is not effectively pursued. We recognized that Canadians' support for the War effort was in part conditional on the government doing everything in its power to make sure we would not find ourselves in a similar situation a few years down the road. Parenthetically, that is why Canada has also been in the forefront of those calling for a strengthening of the UN system.

On the proliferation front, we believed that what was needed, in the first instance, was a jolt of political energy to spur ongoing efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, as well as to encourage progress in non-proliferation negotiations and the development of measures to deal with the virtually untouched realm of conventional arms accumulation.

As a consequence, the initiative launched by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs on February 8 had two components. We are pursuing both with vigour. The first consists of the mobilization of political

will by encouraging leaders of all states to commit themselves publicly and unequivocally to do their utmost to condemn and combat weapons' proliferation. In gathering political commitments at the highest levels, we hope to generate and maintain the momentum necessary to free specific negotiations and processes from the complacency or technical minutiae in which they have tended to become mired and thus to make progress on what are among the most urgent security issues of our time.

The second component of our initiative consists of an action program for moving ahead in each area of concern...

One of the reasons for Canada's success in ensuring that proliferation issues receive the required attention at the political level has been that our initiative has found a tremendous resonance in the international community. In the months since we put forward our proposal, numerous countries have come forward with their suggestions for dealing with proliferation in the post-Gulf-War world, echoing ideas prominent in the Canadian initiative... We welcome all of these proposals,

which complement Canadian efforts to advance the same objectives.

Expressions of political concern, however...while extremely welcome and clearly necessary, are not sufficient to bring about an end to proliferation. As we continue to garner high-level commitments, we must make sure that these commitments are reflected in progress at the nuts-and-bolts level. We have no illusions about the practical, technical difficulties involved in the measures we are proposing.

You have dealt with many of these difficulties — and possibilities — in your conference. Supply-side control represents the front line of the war against proliferation. It is not an ideal solution. There are questions about effectiveness, about comprehensiveness, about verification, about capturing dual-use goods and technology, about capturing services, about discrimination and about implications for legitimate, non-military transactions. But we do not live in an ideal world.

In tackling proliferation in the real world, it is a question of doing what is feasible, while bearing always in mind the ideal and striving towards it wherever possible. Where effective movement can be made towards curbing the spread of clearly unacceptable weapons, movement should be made. This may mean tightening and better-coordinating national export controls. It may mean an agreement among countries in a region not to acquire particular types of weapons. We would hope it could mean a common effort by the entire international community, working on a common understanding that what is prohibited to one should ultimately be prohibited to all. But Canada does not believe that the best should be the enemy of the good, or even the enemy of the next-to-worst, if that is all that is attainable at any one moment.

Supply-side control is one part of what is feasible and attainable now. It will not on its own stop proliferation, as many of you have remarked over these past few days. What is ultimately required is a comprehensive approach that deals with both supply and demand and draws as many states as possible into effective, global regimes. In the interim, however, where no global instru-