(f) At the appropriate stage, a substantial and adequately armed military force should be established, to prevent aggression and enforce observance of the disarmament agreement; and an international authority should be created, in association with the United Nations, to control this force and to ensure that it is not used for any purpose inconsistent with the charter.

4. On the basis of the above principles, it should be possible, given goodwill on both sides, to reconcile the present differences of approach between the different plans put forward.

the Union, and that it was the desire of the Unanning Negotiations at the Commonwealth as a that South Africa should remain within the Commonwealth as a 5. The principle military powers should resume direct negotia-tions without delay in close contact with the United Nations, which is responsible for disarmament under the Charter. Since peace is the concern of the whole world, other nations should also be associated with the disarmament negotiations, either directly or through some special machinery to be set up by the United Nations, or by both means.

6. Side by side with the political negotiations, experts should start working out the details of the inspection systems required for the measures of disarmament applicable to each stage in accordance with the practice adopted at the Geneva nuclear tests conference.

7. Every effort should be made to secure rapid agreement to the permanent banning of nuclear weapons tests by all nations and to arrangements for verifying the observance of the agreement. Such an agreement is urgent, since otherwise further countries may soon become nuclear powers, which would increase the danger of war and further complicate the problem of disarmament. More Moreover, an agreement on nuclear tests, apart from its direct advantages, would provide a powerful psychological impetus to agreement over the wider field of disarmament.

8. Disarmament without inspection would be as unacceptable as inspection without inspection would be as unacceptable as inspection without disarmament. Disarmament and inspection are integral parts of the same question and must be negotiated together; and both must be made as complete and effective as is humanly possible. It must, however, be recognized that no safe-guards can provide one hundred percent protection against error or treachery. Nevertheless, the risks involved in the process of disarmament must be balanced against the risks involved in the continuence of the arms rece continuance of the arms race.

9. It is arguable whether the arms race is the cause or the result of distruct between nations. But it is clear that the problems of disarmament and international confidence are closely linked. Therefore, while striving for the abolition of armaments, all nations must actively endeavour to reduce tension by helping to remove other causes of friction and suspicion.

Annex II to Final Communiqué

CYPRUS

(Communiqué issued March 13)

Ministers accepted a request from the Republic of Cyrpus for admission to Commonwealth membership. They invited the President of the Republic to join the meeting.