

Government, would make such disaffection dangerous, would here be wanting. Where but a single Parliament exists, serious disaffection and open revolt can take place only where some flagrant act of tyranny is perpetrated upon the mass of the people: under a Federal Government, they may and do result from local prejudices, from grievances merely imaginary, from misconception of ideas, and from a mere spirit of insubordination.

Another evil of this jealous attitude naturally assumed by the general, and the various local Governments towards each other, is its demoralizing effect upon the people generally. Each of these Governments, as a natural consequence of its relative position, will endeavour, by every possible means, to lessen the aggressive power of the others—such a procedure being the most easy and effective mode of hindering that power ever being turned against the particular Government in question. When all are thus striving with the same object in view, the result must be—unless a state of *open warfare* occurs, to raise and strengthen one State by annihilating others—that they will weaken each other; and this weakening influence must continue incessantly until arrested by some revolution completely changing the relative position of the States participating in it. It need scarcely be said, that a Government cannot be thus weakened with reference to the exercise of its power in one particular direction only. Its strength must be diminished in every respect. It becomes incapable of discharging its legitimate functions within its own territory, and when its authority is unquestioned from without. Not only does its Executive find itself deficient in the actual physical means of enforcing the laws; but it soon proves to be comparatively destitute of moral influence among the people over whom it nominally presides; for when a Government is thus so notoriously hedged in and fettered as to be incapable of acting with requisite freedom, people soon lose all respect for it, and particularly for that branch which interferes most directly with their personal inclinations. The Executive is therefore incapable of discharging the duties which the Constitution imposes upon it; and if the State does not gradually

lapse into a condition of complete political anarchy and social barbarism, it is because the sound moral sense and high intellectual development of a large majority of the people produce, from the outset, an opposite tendency.

This disrespect which, under a Federal Constitution, a person is likely to entertain towards the constituted ruling powers of the land is increased by the two-fold allegiance which, in strictness, he *owes* to the Federal and local Governments. Cases must frequently occur in which a question will arise as to which of the two has the right, and which has not the right, to exert a direct control over his actions. This being the fact, he will naturally set himself to work, when he wishes those actions to be entirely uncontrolled, to play an adroit game between the two, and eventually, to evade the authorities of both. The facility which such a state of things affords for thus playing off one set of constituted authorities against the other, must leave upon the mind of the individual in question anything but a feeling of respect for either.

A further objection to the Federal form of Government may be found in the fact that it renders widely dissimilar, in different parts of the country, certain institutions which the welfare of the people requires to be everywhere alike. The difference in the constitutions of the various Confederate States, is itself an evil of no ordinary magnitude, particularly when attended by a difference in the elective franchise. But the principal evil of this class is, that, owing to a number of separate and independent Legislatures, there must be a like number of distinct legal codes; and this amongst a people all professing to belong to one and the same nation. That all civil laws—with the exception of a few *necessary* local regulations which need not be specially indicated—should be general in their application, throughout the *whole* nation which acknowledges them, and that the mode of administering them should be uniform to the same extent, are incontrovertible; and are also too obvious to require any arguments in proof. The evils which must result from any other arrangement are too numerous to