

any difficulty in finding room for them in Soviet institutions.

Another important advantage which the Soviet leaders enjoy is the undoubted anti-colonial feeling which still prevails and will prevail for a long time in many of the important countries of Asia. The Russians, ignoring that they are at the present time themselves the world's greatest colonial power, claim constantly and insistently that all of the ills of the former colonial possessions, whether in low health standards, inadequate food, and lack of technical progress; or floods or droughts or failure in football, all these are to be attributed to the earlier administrations of the capitalist colonial powers. They contrast this with the boasted achievements of the Soviet Union, whether in science, technical progress, or the arts; all of which they falsely claim stem entirely from the revolution of 1917. The implication is that what Russia has done in less than forty years of communism, other countries can also do. For this purpose, they should be sensible enough to negotiate special trade assistance pacts and accept technical advice from the Soviet Union; aid given, so they claim, without any political strings attached whatsoever; no pressures to join regional security organizations or to lease bases, or to restrict their trade with other countries in certain commodities. All these pressures, so they try to point out, are left to the capitalist and "colonial" powers which had oppressed them in the past. Nor should we dismiss this appeal as absurd because we know it to be distorted and dishonest.

#### Competitive Co-existence in Economic Field

From all this you will, I think, realize that the entry of the Soviet bloc into the arena of competitive co-existence in the economic field is certain to provide us with many difficult problems.

We will also make a grave mistake if we assume with excessive self-confidence that these Soviet promises and pretensions will soon be exposed because they will not be able to make good their offers of trade and economic aid to the under-developed countries. They may be more successful in this regard than we expect.

We can, in any event, be quite sure that the Russians are sufficiently astute to gain the greatest possible political advantage from their various operations abroad, while insisting that what they offer and what they are prepared to do comes in a spirit of pure and unconditional benevolence. In short, we in the West are facing a long and difficult period of competitive co-existence in this as in other

fields. The competition will be formidable in extent, and astute in its planning on the other side and is not likely to be conducted under Marquis of Queensbury rules. And the Communists think that they are going to win it.

One of the leaders in Russia told me when I was there last autumn that it was his conviction that we in the West were a pretty soft lot, and that we could not endure nearly so well as the Soviet people the rigors and the sacrifices which this competitive co-existence would involve. Indeed, this seems to be one of the strong convictions of the directors of Soviet policies. We should have no doubt that they will do everything within their power, short of atomic war, to prove that their convictions are valid, and their confidence justified.

#### What Can the West Do?

What then, can we in the West do, and what must we *not* do, in meeting this new and serious challenge:

- (a) We must continue to supply, and even increase, economic and technical aid for the under-developed areas. We should not attach political strings to that aid of a kind which would neutralize its value and prevent its good reception. We cannot purchase reliable allies or real friends among the peoples we are co-operating with and helping, and we should not try to do so.
- (b) We should not in our wisdom urge our friends in the technically under-developed areas of the world to reject out of hand offers of aid from the Soviet bloc. They will themselves have to assess and avoid the political or economic perils which may be involved. We must count on the good sense of the leaders of these peoples to make the necessary distinction between the type of aid being given by the Western world and that offered by the Soviet bloc. We must by our own policies ensure that this distinction is not only clear, but in our favour.
- (c) We must not enter into any kind of auctioning competition with the Soviet bloc, attempting to match or to out-bid their offers, and so be drawn into enterprises which may not be in themselves desirable. We can never hope to beat the communists in promises.
- (d) It is also very important, I think, that the United Nations should be brought more closely into the international economic assistance picture; as has recently been suggested by the U.N. Secretary-General and others. This will be the