

at worst costing very little if the plan succeeds and there is economic recovery in Europe. Why, then, limit guarantees to the sum of \$340,000,000 as the act is now drafted? Why not give the principle full swing up to whatever limit Congress fixes over and above the \$6,800,000,000 of known immediate needs, and see to what extent private investments fill the void.

Fifteen months is an inadequate time for analyzing investment projects. It sometimes takes approximately that much time to analyze a prospective enterprise of any magnitude in the United States where the circumstances are far less complex. Organizing the administration and getting under way mechanically takes time, but the desired effect in Europe accrues immediately. A minimum of three years should be allowed for these guarantees. Congress can review the situation whenever it so desires.

III. Export guarantees: As an adjunct of the administrator's office in the United States should be a system of export guarantees utilizing whatever portion of the guarantee authority the administrator finds proper to finance commercial exports. Here again Canada pioneered the way immediately after the war; such guarantees are available there as in the United Kingdom. It works - the pattern is ready for us.

IV. Confining guarantees to projects eligible for loans to participating countries from appropriated funds: It is impracticable to have private investors in effect competing with the participating countries for an allocation out of the appropriated funds. It would be too much to expect of a participating government to give due consideration to an applicant for private investment if the loan had to come out of the same funds which the government itself was eligible to receive, unless by chance the private applicant undertook a project which was high on the government's own list of essential enterprises.

It is only reasonable to assume that participating countries will concentrate much of the benefits of their loans on such essential public projects as reconstruction of ports, rebuilding damaged or destroyed utilities, repairing transportation and constructing mass housing projects, schools and hospitals. Why limit private investors to the same general category of projects as participating countries would undertake? If the object is, as it should be, to release a vast resource of private initiative and capital for energetic attack along the full length and breadth of the economic battlefront of devastated Europe, then let private industry select its projects in conjunction with private interests in countries abroad, just as Crane and Company and the Goodrich tire company have done in the Netherlands.

Individual American and European initiative should be released at every possible point with full appreciation of its volatile power.

Without excluding private enterprise from the participating government's lists of projects (a construction company might well undertake the construction of a port facility for a participating country in exchange for an assignment of future revenues from that port, in whole or in part), but the administrator should be specifically instructed to leave the widest possible latitude of choice to private investors, subject to approval of the participating country.