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## *Preface*

**D**r. James F. Keeley is an Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science at the University of Calgary and is associated with that University's Strategic Studies Programme. He has studied the IAEA for a number of years and agreed to undertake this study at the initiative of the Department of External Affairs. The research for this study was conducted during the period 1985 through 1987. It included several weeks of interviews and research in Ottawa and Vienna.

The IAEA has often been cited generally as an example of a functioning verification system that could be emulated in other areas of arms control. The specific task undertaken by Dr. Keeley was to examine in detail in what ways the IAEA's experience could serve as a model in other arms control contexts. Dr. Keeley's report provides general observations on the lessons that the IAEA can teach respecting arms control verification. It concentrates, in particular, on the relevance of these lessons for verifying a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Dr. Keeley concludes his paper with a number of suggestions for further research in this area. However, this paper does not contend that all these suggestions need be undertaken before concluding a convention on chemical weapons.