

(Mr. Adelman, United States of America)

And basically this is my message to you today: the path to more ambitious arms control, in all areas, lies through the gateway of greater openness. To quote Dr. Sakharov, once again, the issue here "is not simply a moral one, but also a paramount, practical ingredient of international trust and security".

The world is still very far from achieving this kind of openness, which is one reason why arms control remains a very painstaking, very difficult, very timely business. Take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending. You all know just as well as I do how slow and careful we must be in terms of arms control and how frustrating is a lot of the pace of the arms control talks, because all of us in this room grapple with the issue on a daily basis. But take an issue as rudimentary as published figures on defence spending, something that the United Nations has also been discussing for a good number of years.

In 1985, according to our best estimates, the United States and the Soviet Union each devoted around \$250 billion to defence. Figures on United States defence spending are, of course, widely available in open sources. They are broken down by category. They are extensively discussed. They are scrutinized in the United States Congress -- probably scrutinized a little too much, if you ask me -- but they are scrutinized in the United States Congress and elsewhere in our society. Figures for Soviet defence spending, on the other hand, must be derived from careful analysis. Why? Because published Soviet figures bear absolutely no relationship to the reality of the Soviet defence effort.

In 1985, for example, the Soviet Union claims to have spent 20.3 billion roubles on defence. Assuming the official exchange rate of approximately \$1.50 per rouble, that comes to less than \$35 billion. Now,