

leading officials of the dominant Catholic Church, for his renowned uncle had been a terror to the Papal See. We are to add to all this, the fact that he was denied the moral sympathy of even a single foreign court. The French army was an army of Catholics—in short, the Church power was the only power in France. With the purpose and ken of the ablest and—as the world is now earnest to acknowledge—the most successful diplomacy of history, he could scarcely do otherwise than make friendship with the Pope. On looking back now, it is not difficult to perceive, in every apparent movement of the Imperial Court toward Rome, a real movement in the opposite direction. His Church sympathies may have been merely a political show—a well understood and skillfully arranged means to the ultimate abrogation of the papal power in France. The tables are now turned. Napoleon is at this moment the greatest power in Europe. The Imperial army moves on at the beck of his finger. The popular voice of France portrays reverently and glowingly his praises; he has conquered the heart of France. The proud courts of Europe court his favour, and, with a single notable exception, approve his present political career. The powerful moral sympathy of the Protestant world is in his favour. Under these circumstances, what cares Napoleon for the hasty fulminations of Rome,—the threatened bulls of excommunication from St. Peters. Is it not possible that he courts them? His love of power, would lead him to strike down, at the earliest possible moment, every vestige of foreign domination in the empire. The contest with popery will neither be long nor doubtful. Judging from present indications, nothing but the death of Napoleon, can arrest the downfall of the papal power in Europe.

“Since penning the above, the most stirring news reaches us, that the Papal troubles are greatly on the increase. The grave results which have been casting their shadows beforehand, are rapidly hastening to their consummation. May the Ruler of nations over-rule all to the speedy downfall of ecclesiastical tyranny and error, and the upbuilding of truth!”

PROSPECTS OF ANOTHER WAR.

The internal state of Austria becomes every day more precarious. The Hungarians are the most determined, though the most moderate of rebels. They do not, like the French in their various revolutions, seek to overthrow a dynasty, or, like the Italians in their late struggle, to drive out the foreigner. They are so far acquiescent in the present dynasty that they do not wish for any other, and, though the Germans are to the Magyars as foreigners, yet so many of the former race are settled in the country that no thought of a general explosion can be entertained. But the determination to insist on all the old historical rights of the country is as firm as ever, and, in case of their being refused, the people are quite ready to assert them by force of arms.

The estimate of the insurrectionary impulse of a country must vary according to the temperament of the observer. It may be said, however, that, according to the most trustworthy authority, there is no less discord between the races, and less difference of view between the aristocracy and peasantry, than was the case in 1849. Then there were two widely sundered parties in Hungary—the party which made the constitutional department, and the party which under Kossuth, converted it into a Democratic experiment. The decay of these rivalries makes Hungary more powerful than ever, and a more dangerous enemy to the Austrian system of Government. Unless sternly opposed, Hungary will be certain to give its assistance to Italy by a timely diversion.

We can, indeed, only imagine one cure for the evils of Austria, one escape from the many dangers which