

the explanation that Rose provides the historical record of government policy whereas Thorburn's coverage relates to the more "idealistic" qualities of the NDP, a party never yet in power and therefore more idealistic than practical. The Canadian approach to NATO is described as "laggard and parsimonious." The low level of defence expenditure, the poor state of equipment and the inadequate manpower are cited as evidence of semi-commitment. Verbal support for the Alliance is not reflected by government action. The NDP approach is equated by Thorburn to semialigned status. Continued membership support has fluctuated, but total opposition to nuclear weapons remains firm.

Nils Ørvik deals with NATO under "Deterrence versus Nonprovocation." The coverage is extensive. The Norwegian policy based on a "calculated risk" permits the government to adhere to a semialigned status. "No provocation to the USSR" is the key to Norwegian defence.

The book closes with two separate conclusions. The first by Ørvik holds that "the semialigned still seem almost frivolously unaware of the relationship between military power and their national security." Ørvik's view is that peace "can never come free of charge," and his contention that nations which renege on Alliance commitments should not rely on outside support in times of crisis is well made. The second conclusion provides the views of the other authors. It holds that semialignment augments the capacity for "sober reflection" and a return to détente. The proponents fully recognize that the "American superpower [might] cease consulting the small members" and act unilaterally.

The views presented in this excellent book may well be provocative and unpalatable to many readers. Documentation supports the conflicting assessments. In consequence, this book should be placed on the compulsory reading list not only for students but also for all personnel dealing with NATO issues. Professor Ørvik and the collaborating authors must be commended for the depth of their research and their informative presentations.

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Solutions or resolutions

by Clyde Sanger

International Conflict Resolutions: Theory and Practice edited by Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1986, 159 pages, US\$30.00.

Rainbow Warrior: the French Attempt to Sink Greenpeace by the Sunday Times *Insight* team. Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1986, 302 pages, \$12.95

Canadians have made a reputation in peacekeeping operations and are trying to distinguish themselves in the technical business of verifying arms control agreements. We are pleased when others refer to Canada as "the peaceable kingdom." But what have we done to advance the science (or is it an art?) of actually *making* peace and resolving conflicts, rather than sending troops to stand for years in a buffer zone between belligerents? Not many names leap to mind: Norman Alcock is one, and maybe Geoffrey Pearson's Institute will fulfill the claim of its title and contribute to "international peace and security."

Here, anyway, with its genesis at the University of Maryland, is a short book to inspire Canadians in this direction. Six of its seven authors are academics — American, British and Australian — who acknowledge that studying international relations is "like working in the pathology department of a hospital. . . recording mainly horrid facts." But they go on to claim that recent years have "brought evidence of a breakthrough towards means of resolving conflicts between nations, even protracted conflicts, in place of trying to manage them by threat, force or peacekeeping measures." With some sixty conflicts continuing between smaller states, before you count the tensions between the superpowers, the arrival of these "semi-optimistic" activists is welcome.

Michael Banks sets the stage by sketching in bold terms the theories of international relations since World War I. The period of *realism* in the 1940s and 1950s was "an intellectual disaster

zone," but he is excited by the emergence of *pluralism* in the 1970s. Pluralism to him means holding a general view of the world and not being "imprisoned," as foreign policy analysis has been, by the "assumption that states are the principal actors in the international system."

This is a central theme of the book, that power lies not with so-called nation states: fewer than twenty UN members are genuine nation states, these authors say. Rather power lies with "identity groups," who may cohere more because of language, race and religion than because of shared territory. Also they note that protracted conflicts are primarily over non-negotiable values, rather than over interests that can be traded.

This begins to sound hopeless; and indeed the seventh author, a veteran US diplomat (Ambassador John W. McDonald) points out that the potential for conflict multiplies if you dismiss nation states in favor of communities and an "inter-communal level" of problem-solving. But the six, who include a sociologist and a psychiatrist, stick to their line. Professor Groom contributes a sensible chapter on problem-solving. Define the problem, he says; break it into manageable parts; find goals that require cooperation, like tourism in Cyprus; use a facilitator. And so on. Their book at times reads like the bestseller *Getting to Yes* by Harvard's Roger Fisher — but translated back into academic language. An important difference is the emphasis they place on the role of a third party, which should be a panel of resource people rather than a mediator or judge. And they give examples of workshops — scholars mixed with practitioners — which addressed and sometimes eased disputes from Malaysia to Lebanon. It is a stimulating book, with more fresh thoughts than this review can convey.

In *The Rainbow Warrior* the investigative team of the London weekly do their all-too-thorough job on the disgraceful plot of the French external security service, the DGSE, to destroy the flagship of the Greenpeace campaign against nuclear testing in the Pacific. The single stone this team fails to turn is the one sheltering President Mitterrand; and one has to assume he was not privy to the plot, although his close friend and Defence Minister Charles Hernu sank to the bottom over it. The tale ties in with the other book