

Army proved its competence, and men of all parties have united at last for a common patriotic object. Nothing of late years has done more to restore national self-confidence, and the effect on international relationships was equally important.

We may treat the foreign policy of Italy since 1911 as forming one epoch. The Triple Alliance, with the commercial treaties that perhaps made it most valuable to Italian feeling, was renewed in December 1912 for a fresh term of five years, but it is not inconsistent with that to say that the ties which bind Italy to her allies have since 1911 been seriously relaxed. The Italian attack on the Turks, the chosen clients of the German Powers, was a distinct affront to them: in the Agadir crisis Italy definitely cast her weight against the German scheme for acquisitions in Morocco itself: the Austrian veto against any attack on the Turks from the Adriatic hampered the Italian operations in 1911, and was naturally contrasted with the friendly attitude of Great Britain, who made all communication between Constantinople and Tripoli through Egypt impossible. The strenuous efforts of the Kaiser to improve the relations of his allies did something, but in any case very strong reasons compelled the Marquis di San Giuliano to accept a renewal of the Alliance, in spite of severe criticism. It was impossible to expect very cordial support from France for the Italian policy in Tripoli, which did not improve her position in Tunis. Neither from France nor from Great Britain could any great readiness be expected to accept a war with the Sultan, the head of Islam and the faith which millions of their subjects professed. The German Powers could at least use their influence with the Young Turks to secure a Turkish evacuation of Tripoli and to get for Italy rights of